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Abstract
We infer a term structure of interbank risk from spreads between rates on interest rate swaps
indexed to LIBOR and overnight indexed swaps. We develop a model of interbank risk to
decompose the term structure into default and non-default (liquidity) components. We find
that, on average, from August 2007 to January 2011, the fraction of total interbank risk
due to default risk increases with maturity. At the short end of the term structure, the
non-default component is important in the first half of the sample period and is correlated
with measures of funding and market liquidity. At longer maturities, the default component
is the dominant driver of interbank risk throughout the sample period. Results hold true
in both the USD and EUR markets and are robust to different model parameterizations
and measures of interbank default risk. The analysis has implications for monetary and
regulatory policy and for pricing, hedging, and risk-management in swap markets.
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“The age of innocence – when banks lent to each other unsecured for three months or longer at only a
small premium to expected policy rates – will not quickly, if ever, return”.
Mervin King, Bank of England Governor, 21 October 2008
1 Introduction
Interbank risk, as defined in this paper, is the risk of direct or indirect loss resulting from lend-
ing in the interbank money market. The recent financial crisis has highlighted the implications
of such risk for financial markets and economic growth. While existing studies have provided
important insights on the determinants of short term interbank risk, we still know very little
about the term structure of interbank risk. In this paper, we provide a comprehensive analysis
of this topic. First, we develop a model of the term structure of interbank risk. Second, we
apply the model to analyze interbank risk since the onset of the financial crisis, decomposing
the term structure of interbank risk into default and non-default (liquidity) components.
To illustrate the importance of the term structure dimension for understanding interbank
risk, consider Figure 1. The solid line shows the spread between 3M LIBOR, which is a
reference rate for unsecured interbank borrowing and lending, and the fixed rate on a 3M
overnight indexed swap (OIS), which is a common risk-free rate proxy. This money market
spread is used in many papers and in the financial press as a measure of interbank risk. The
dotted line shows the spread between the fixed rate on a 5Y regular interest rate swap (IRS)
with floating-leg payments indexed to 3M LIBOR, and the fixed rate on a 5Y OIS. We show
in the paper that this spread essentially reflects expectations about future 3M LIBOR-OIS
spreads and, therefore, provides valuable insights into market participants’ perceptions about
future interbank risk. As such, we can use IRS-OIS spreads at different maturities to infer a
term structure of interbank risk.
Prior to the onset of the credit crisis, the term structure of interbank risk was essentially
flat with swap spreads only a few basis points higher than money market spreads. Then, at
the onset of the crisis in August 2007, money market spreads increased much more than swap
spreads. This resulted in a strongly downward-sloping term structure of interbank risk, indi-
cating that market participants expected the extremely high levels of interbank risk observed
in the money market to be a relatively short-lived phenomenon. Finally, from Fall 2009 to the
end of our sample period, money market spreads were more or less back to pre-crisis levels (ex-
cept for a transitory increase related to the escalation of the European sovereign debt crisis),
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while swap spreads remained well above pre-crisis levels and significantly higher than money
market spreads. The result was an upward-sloping term structure of interbank risk, indicating
that market participants expected interbank risk to increase in the future (and/or required a
large risk premium for bearing future interbank risk). The term structure, therefore, contains
important information about interbank risk that is not contained in money market spreads.
A LIBOR-OIS spread can arise for several reasons. An obvious candidate is default risk.
LIBOR is a benchmark indicating the average rate at which large, creditworthy banks be-
longing to the LIBOR panel can obtain unsecured funding for longer terms (typically 3M or
6M) in the interbank money market. An OIS is a swap with floating payments based on a
reference rate for unsecured overnight funding, which we assume equals the average cost of
unsecured overnight funding for LIBOR panel banks.1 An important feature of the LIBOR
panel is that its composition is updated over time to include only creditworthy banks – a bank
that experiences a significant deterioration in its credit quality will be dropped from the panel
and be replaced by a bank with superior credit quality. Therefore, the OIS rate reflects the
average credit quality of a refreshed pool of creditworthy banks, while LIBOR incorporates
the risk that the average credit quality of an initial set of creditworthy banks will deteriorate
over the term of the loan.2 Consequently, LIBOR exceeds the OIS rate.
To formalize this, we set up a model where, at a given point in time, we distinguish between
the average default intensity of the periodically refreshed panel and the default intensity of an
average bank within an initial panel. Deterioration in the credit quality of this bank relative
to the average credit quality of the periodically refreshed panel occurs according to a jump
process. The first jump time is interpreted as the time when the bank is dropped from the
panel. The risk of credit quality deterioration (i.e., the intensity of the jump process) varies
stochastically over time. In this setting, the default component of the LIBOR-OIS spread is
driven by the expected credit quality deterioration of an average bank within the initial panel.
A LIBOR-OIS spread may also arise due to factors not directly related to default risk,
1While this assumption is true in the EUR market, it is only approximately true in the USD market, since the
reference rate (the effective Federal Funds rate) reflects the average funding cost for a broader set of banks than
the LIBOR panel. Nevertheless, Afonso, Kovner, and Schoar (2009) show that credit risk in the Federal Funds
market is managed via credit rationing rather than interest rates, so that only creditworthy banks participate
in the Federal Funds market. Such credit rationing was particularly prevalent in the aftermath of the Lehman
default.
2We stress that there is negligible default risk in the OIS contract due to collateralization. However, the
OIS rate does reflect default risk due to the indexation of the floating leg to an unsecured overnight rate.
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primarily liquidity. There are several reasons why liquidity in the market for longer-term in-
terbank funding can deteriorate. For instance, banks may refrain from lending long-term for
precautionary reasons, if they fear adverse shocks to their own funding situation, or for spec-
ulative reasons, if they anticipate possible fire-sales of assets by other financial institutions.3
Rather than modeling these mechanisms directly, we posit a “residual” factor that captures
the component of the LIBOR-OIS spread that is not due to default risk. To the extent that
liquidity effects are correlated with default risk, the residual factor captures the component of
liquidity that is unspanned by default risk.
Since a long-term IRS-OIS spread reflects expectations about future short-term LIBOR-
OIS spreads, the term structure of IRS-OIS spreads reflects the term structures of the default
and non-default components of LIBOR-OIS spreads. To infer the default component, we
use information from the credit default swap (CDS) market. At each observation date, we
construct a CDS spread term structure for an average panel bank as a composite of the CDS
spread term structures for the individual panel banks. Assuming that CDS spreads are pure
measures of default risk of the underlying entities, the CDS spread term structure for an
average panel bank identifies the process driving the risk of credit quality deterioration.
Our model is set within a general affine framework. Depending on the specification, two
factors drive the OIS term structure, one or two factors drive the default component of LIBOR-
OIS spreads (i.e., the risk of credit quality deterioration), and one or two factors drive the
non-default component of LIBOR-OIS spreads. The model is highly tractable with analytical
expressions for LIBOR, OIS, IRS, and CDS. In valuing swap contracts, we match as closely
as possible current market practice regarding collateralization.
We apply the model to study interbank risk from the onset of the financial crisis in August
2007 until January 2011. We utilize a panel data set consisting of term structures of OIS rates,
IRS-OIS spreads indexed to 3M and 6M LIBOR, and CDS spreads – all with maturities up to
10Y. The model is estimated by maximum likelihood in conjunction with the Kalman filter.
We conduct a specification analysis, which shows that a specification with two factors
driving the OIS term structure, two factors driving the default component of the LIBOR-OIS
spread, and one factor driving the non-default component of the LIBOR-OIS spread has a
3The precautionary motive for cash hoarding is modeled by Allen, Carletti, and Gale (2009) and Acharya
and Skeie (2010), while the speculative motive for cash hoarding is modeled by Acharya, Gromb, and Yorul-
mazer (2007), Acharya, Shin, and Yorulmazer (2010) and Diamond and Rajan (2010). A recent model by Gale
and Yorulmazer (2011) features both the precautionary and speculative motive for cash holdings.
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satisfactory fit to the data, while being fairly parsimonious. We then use this specification to
decompose the term structure of interbank risk into default and non-default components. We
find that, on average, the fraction of total interbank risk due to default risk increases with
maturity. At the short end of the term structure, the non-default component is important in
the first half of the sample period, while at longer maturities, the default component is the
dominant driver of interbank risk throughout the sample period.
To understand the determinants of the non-default component of interbank risk, we relate
the residual factor to a number of proxies for funding liquidity and market liquidity, which
tend to be highly intertwined (Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009)). Given its over-the-counter
structure, we do not have liquidity measures specific to the unsecured interbank term funding
market. Instead, we consider two liquidity measures for the related secured term funding
market: the spread between 3M Agency MBS and Treasury repo rates and the liquidity factor
from Fontaine and Garcia (2011). We also consider several market liquidity measures: the
Treasury market liquidity factor from Hu, Pan, and Wang (2010), the Refcorp-Treasury bond
yield spread suggested by Longstaff (2004), and two corporate bond market liquidity factors
from Dick-Nielsen, Feldhutter, and Lando (2012). Our residual factor is significantly related to
the components of the liquidity measures, which are unspanned by interbank default risk, with
the R2 reaching 64 percent in a multivariate regression specification.4 This strongly suggests
that the non-default component of interbank risk largely captures liquidity effects not spanned
by default risk.
We also provide tentative evidence on the pricing of interbank risk in the interest rate
swap market. We find that swap market participants require compensation for exposure to
variation in interbank default risk, while we are not able to reliably estimate the compensation
required for exposure to the residual factor. This implies that in the first half of the sample
period, when the non-default component dominates, the overall compensation for variation in
interbank risk is low. In contrast, in the second half of the sample period, when the default
component dominates, the overall compensation for variation in interbank risk is significant.
For instance, the instantaneous Sharpe ratio of being long the 5Y IRS-OIS spread (for the IRS
indexed to 3M LIBOR) is estimated to have averaged 0.35 from early 2009 to the end of the
sample period.
4For each liquidity measure, the component that is unspanned by interbank default risk is given by the
residual from a regression of the liquidity measure on the first two principal components of the composite CDS
term structure.
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We perform a variety of robustness checks, which show that the results hold true for
alternative model parameterizations and measures of interbank default risk. By using CDS
spreads to identify the default component of interbank risk, our approach is reminiscent of
Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis (2005), Blanco, Brennan, and Marsh (2005), Beber, Brandt, and
Kavajecz (2009), and Ang and Longstaff (2011), among others, who use CDS spreads as pure
measures of default risk. However, a number of recent papers have found that CDS spreads
may be affected by liquidity effects.5 Since we mostly use CDS contracts written on large
financial institutions, which are among the most liquid contracts in the CDS market, and
since we aggregate individual CDS spreads, which reduces the effect of idiosyncratic noise in
the individual CDS spreads, we believe it is reasonable to use the composite CDS spreads
to measure default risk. Nevertheless, we consider two alternative measures of default risk
that correct for possible liquidity effects. First, we measure default risk by 90 percent of the
composite CDS spreads, which, given the results in Buhler and Trapp (2010), seems to be a
reasonable lower bound on the default component of CDS spreads. And, second, we measure
default risk by composite CDS spreads constructed solely from the banks with the most liquid
CDS contracts. None of these alternative measures substantially change the decomposition of
the term structure interbank risk.
We also address concerns about the integrity of LIBOR during parts of the sample period.6
Note, first, that the procedure for computing LIBOR as well as governance mechanisms in-
tended to identify anomalous rates should minimize the impact of possible strategic behavior
by certain market participants.7 Note, second, that even if LIBOR were affected, this is un-
likely to impact our results, since interbank risk is primarily inferred from the cross-section of
swap rates, which are determined in highly competitive markets. Instead, idiosyncratic varia-
tion in LIBOR rates will show up as a pricing error in our Kalman filter setting. Nonetheless,
5See, e.g., Buhler and Trapp (2010) and Bongaerts, de Jong, and Driessen (2011). While it is possible that
CDS spreads are also affected by counterparty risk, Arora, Gandhi, and Longstaff (2009) find that this effect is
minimal, which is consistent with the widespread use of collateralization and netting agreements.
6The issue is whether certain banks strategically manipulated their LIBOR quotes to signal information about
their credit quality or liquidity needs or to influence LIBOR to benefit positions in LIBOR-linked instruments.
7Indeed, a Bank of International Settlements study finds that “available data do not support the hypothesis
that contributor banks manipulated their quotes to profit from positions based on fixings”, see Gyntelberg and
Wooldridge (2008, p. 70). Likewise, an IMF study finds that “it appears that U.S. dollar LIBOR remains an
accurate measure of a typical creditworthy bank’s marginal cost of unsecured U.S. dollar term funding”, see
IMF (2008, p. 76).
5
as an additional check, we reestimate the model using only swap rates but find no significant
changes to the results.
Throughout, we also report results for the EUR market. Not only does this serve as an
additional robustness check, but this market is interesting in its own right. First, by several
measures, the market is even larger than the USD market. Second, the structure of the
EUR market is such that the reference overnight rate in an OIS exactly matches the average
cost of unsecured overnight funding of EURIBOR (the EUR equivalent of LIBOR) panel
banks, providing a check of this assumption. And, third, the main shocks to the interbank
money market in the second half of the sample period emanated from the Eurozone with its
sovereign debt crisis. Indeed, we find that EUR interbank risk is generally higher than USD
interbank risk in the second half of the sample period, while the opposite is true in the first
half. Nevertheless, results on the decomposition of interbank risk, the drivers of the residual
factor, and the risk compensation in the swap market are quite similar to the USD market.
Our analysis has several practical applications. First, the framework could be a valuable
tool for central banks and regulatory authorities, as it provides market expectations about
future stress in the interbank money market. In addition, the decomposition into default and
non-default (liquidity) components can help guide appropriate policy responses (recapitaliza-
tion of banks, termination/introduction of central bank lending facilities, etc). For instance,
our analysis suggests that policy responses in the aftermath of the Lehman Brothers default
were effective at resolving liquidity issues in the interbank market, but have been less effective
at addressing default risk, particularly at longer horizons.8
Second, the model has implications for pricing, hedging, and risk-management in the in-
terest rate swap market. Since the onset of the credit crisis, market participants have been
exposed to significant basis risk : swap cash flows are indexed to LIBOR but, because of collat-
eral agreements, are discounted using rates inferred from the OIS market. Furthermore, swap
portfolios at most financial institutions are composed of swap contracts indexed to LIBOR
rates of various maturities creating another layer of basis risks. Our model provides a useful
framework for managing overall interest rate risk and these basis risks in an integrated way.
Our paper is related to Collin-Dufresne and Solnik (2001), who study the term structure
of spreads between yields on corporate bonds issued by LIBOR banks and IRS rates. In their
8From a regulatory standpoint, the framework could also prove helpful in determining the right discount
curve for the valuation of long-term insurance liabilities, where discount factors are typically allowed to include
a liquidity component but not a default risk component.
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model, a spread arises because bond yields reflect the possibility of deterioration in the credit
quality of current LIBOR banks relative to that of future LIBOR banks. As described above,
in our model a similar mechanism underlies the default component of LIBOR-OIS and IRS-
OIS spreads. Our paper is also related to Liu, Longstaff, and Mandell (2006), Johannes and
Sundaresan (2007), and Feldhutter and Lando (2008), who study the term structure of spreads
between IRS rates and Treasury yields.9 Our paper has a different focus than these papers
and also has the methodological advantage of not using bonds, the prices of which were heavily
influenced by liquidity issues during the financial crisis. By only considering swap contracts,
we expect liquidity to be less of an issue and to be more uniform across instruments leading
to a clean decomposition of the term structure of interbank risk.
A number of papers have analyzed the 3M LIBOR-OIS spread and attempted to decompose
it into default and liquidity components. These papers include Schwartz (2010), Taylor and
Williams (2009), McAndrews, Sarkar, and Wang (2008), Michaud and Upper (2008), and
Eisenschmidt and Tapking (2009). They all study the early phase of the financial crisis before
the collapse of Lehman Brothers and find, with the exception of Taylor and Williams (2009),
that liquidity was a key driver of interbank risk during this period. We find a similar result
for the short end of the term structure of interbank risk. However, at the longer end of the
term structure of interbank risk, default risk appears to have been the dominant driver even
during the early phase of the financial crisis, underscoring the importance of taking the entire
term structure into account when analyzing interbank risk.10
Several papers including Bianchetti (2009), Fujii, Shimada, and Takahashi (2009), Hen-
rard (2009), and Mercurio (2009, 2010) have developed pricing models for interest rate deriva-
tives that take the stochastic IRS-OIS spread into account. These are highly reduced-form
models in that swap spreads indexed to different LIBOR rates are modeled independently of
each other and also not decomposed into different components. In contrast, we provide a uni-
fied model of all such spreads, making it possible to aggregate the risks of large swap portfolios
9Feldhutter and Lando (2008) allow for a non-default component in the spread between LIBOR and the
(unobservable) risk-free rate, which they argue is related to hedging flows in the IRS market. One shortcoming
of their model, when applied to crisis data, is that it does not allow for credit quality deterioration in the
valuation of LIBOR loans.
10Smith (2010) studies LIBOR-OIS spreads of maturities up to 12M within a dynamic term structure model
and attributes the most of the variation in spreads to variation in risk-premia. A somewhat problematic aspect
of her analysis is that the default component of LIBOR-OIS spreads is identified by the spread between LIBOR
and repo rates, which clearly contains a significant liquidity component during much of the period.
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and analyze their underlying determinants.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the market instruments.
Section 3 describes the model of the term structure of interbank risk. Section 4 discusses
the data and the estimation approach. Section 5 presents the results. Section 6 considers a
variety of robustness checks. Section 7 concludes, and several appendices, including an online
appendix, contain additional material.
2 Market instruments
We describe the market instruments that we use in the paper. We first consider the basic
reference rates and then a variety of swap contracts that are indexed to these reference rates.
2.1 Reference rates
A large number of fixed income contracts are tied to an interbank offered rate. The main
reference rate in the USD-denominated fixed income market is the USD London Interbank
Offered Rate (LIBOR), while in the EUR-denominated fixed income market it is the European
Interbank Offered Rate (EURIBOR).11 Both LIBOR and EURIBOR are trimmed averages of
rates submitted by sets of banks. In the case of LIBOR, each contributor bank bases its
submission on the question at what rate could you borrow funds, were you to do so by asking
for and then accepting interbank offers in a reasonable market size. In the case of EURIBOR,
the wording is slightly different and each contributor bank submits the rates at which euro
interbank term deposits are being offered within the euro zone by one prime bank to another.
Therefore, LIBOR is an average of the rates at which banks believe they can obtain unsecured
funding, while EURIBOR is an average of the rates at which banks believe a prime bank can
obtain unsecured funding. This subtle difference becomes important when quantifying the
degree of default risk inherent in the two rates. Both rates are quoted for a range of terms,
with 3M and 6M being the most important and most widely followed. In the following, we let
L(t, T ) denote the (T − t)-maturity LIBOR or EURIBOR rate that fixes at time t.
For both LIBOR and EURIBOR, contributor banks are selected based on their credit
quality and the scale of their market activities. During our sample period, the LIBOR panel
11LIBOR is managed by the British Bankers’ Association, while EURIBOR is managed by the European
Banking Federation. There also exists a EUR LIBOR, although this rate has not received the same benchmark
status as EURIBOR.
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consisted of 16 banks, while the EURIBOR panel was significantly larger and consisted of 42
banks.12 An important feature of both panels is that they are reviewed and revised periodically.
A bank that experiences a significant deterioration in its credit quality (and/or its market
share) will be dropped from the panel and be replaced by a bank with superior credit quality.
An increasing number of fixed income contracts are tied to an index of overnight rates. In
the USDmarket, the benchmark is the effective Federal Funds (FF) rate, which is a transaction-
weighted average of the rates on overnight unsecured loans of reserve balances held at the
Federal Reserve that banks make to one another. In the EUR market, the benchmark is the
Euro Overnight Index Average (EONIA) rate, computed as a transaction-weighted average
of the rates on all overnight unsecured loans in the interbank money market initiated by
EURIBOR panel banks. Therefore, in the EUR market, the benchmark overnight rate reflects
the average cost of unsecured overnight funding of panel banks. We assume that the same
holds for the USD market, although the set of banks from which the effective Federal Funds
rate is computed does not exactly match the LIBOR panel.13
For the sake of convenience we will from now on use “LIBOR” as a generic term for
an interbank offered rate, comprising both LIBOR and EURIBOR, whenever there is no
ambiguity.
2.2 Pricing collateralized contracts
Swap contracts between major financial institutions are virtually always collateralized to the
extent that counterparty risk is negligible.14 In this section, we provide the generic pricing
formula of collateralized cashflows that we will use below to price swap contracts.15 Consider
a contract with a contractual nominal cashflow X at maturity T . Its present value at t < T
is denoted by V (t). We assume that the two parties in the contract agree on posting cash-
collateral on a continuous marking-to-market basis. We also assume that, at any time t < T ,
12After the end of our sample period, the USD LIBOR panel was expanded to 20 banks and the EURIBOR
panel was expanded to 44 banks.
13Participants in the Federal Funds market are those with accounts at Federal Reserve Banks, which include
US depository institutions, US branches of foreign banks, and government-sponsored enterprises.
14Even in the absence of collateralization, counterparty risk usually has only a very small effect on the
valuation of swap contracts; see, e.g., Duffie and Huang (1996). This led to the approach to interest rate swap
pricing in Duffie and Singleton (1997).
15Similar formulas have been derived in various contexts by Johannes and Sundaresan (2007), Fujii, Shimada,
and Takahashi (2009), and Piterbarg (2010).
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the posted amount of collateral equals 100% of the contract’s present value V (t). The receiver
of the collateral can invest it at the risk-free rate r(t) and has to pay an agreed rate rc(t) to
the poster of collateral. The present value thus satisfies the following integral equation











r(s)ds (r(u)− rc(u))V (u) du
]
, (1)
where EQt ≡ E
Q[· | Ft] denotes conditional expectation under the risk-neutral measure Q.
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It is shown in Appendix A that this implies the pricing formula








For X = 1, we obtain the price of a collateralized zero-coupon bond










In the sequel, we assume that the collateral rate rc(t) is equal to an instantaneous proxy L(t, t)
of the overnight rate, which we define as
rc(t) = L(t, t) = lim
T→t
L(t, T ). (4)
In reality, best practice among major financial institutions is daily mark-to-market and
adjustment of collateral. Furthermore, cash collateral is the most popular form of collateral,
since it is free from the issues associated with rehypothecation and allows for faster settlement
times. Finally, FF and EONIA are typically the contractual interest rates earned by cash
collateral in the USD and EUR markets, respectively. The assumptions we make above,
therefore, closely approximate current market reality.17
2.3 Interest rate swaps (IRS)
In a regular interest rate swap (IRS), counterparties exchange a stream of fixed-rate payments
for a stream of floating-rate payments indexed to LIBOR of a particular maturity. More
specifically, consider two discrete tenor structures
t = t0 < t1 < · · · < tN = T (5)
16Throughout, we assume a filtered probability space (Ω,F ,Ft, Q), where Q is a risk-neutral pricing measure.
17ISDA (2010) is a detailed survey of current market practice. Further evidence for the pricing formula
given in this section is provided by Whittall (2010), who reports that the main clearing-house of interbank




t = T0 < T1 < · · · < Tn = T, (6)
and let δ = ti− ti−1 and ∆ = Ti−Ti−1 denote the lengths between tenor dates, with δ < ∆.18
At every time ti, i = 1, ..., N , one party pays δL(ti−1, ti), while at every time Ti, i = 1, ..., n,
the other party pays ∆K, where K denotes the fixed rate on the swap. The swap rate,
IRSδ,∆(t, T ), is the value of K that makes the IRS value equal to zero at inception and is
given by













In the USD market, the benchmark IRS pays 3M LIBOR floating vs. 6M fixed, while in the
EUR market, the benchmark IRS pays 6M EURIBOR floating vs. 1Y fixed. Rates on IRS
indexed to LIBOR of other maturities are obtained via basis swaps as discussed below.
2.4 Basis swaps (BS)
In a basis swap (BS), counterparties exchange two streams of floating-rate payments indexed
to LIBOR of different maturities, plus a stream of fixed payments. The quotation convention
for basis swaps differs across brokers, across markets, and may also have changed over time.19
However, as demonstrated in the online appendix, the differences between the conventions are
negligible. Consider a basis swap in which one party pays the δ1-maturity LIBOR while the
other party pays the δ2-maturity LIBOR with δ1 < δ2. We use the quotation convention in
which the basis swap rate, BSδ1,δ2(t, T ), is given as the difference between the fixed rates on
two IRS indexed to δ2- and δ1-maturity LIBOR, respectively. That is,
BSδ1,δ2(t, T ) = IRSδ2,∆(t, T )− IRSδ1,∆(t, T ). (8)
This convention has the advantage that rates on non-benchmark IRS are very easily obtained
via basis swaps.
2.5 Overnight indexed swaps (OIS)
In an overnight indexed swap (OIS), counterparties exchange a stream of fixed-rate payments
for a stream of floating-rate payments indexed to a compounded overnight rate (FF or EONIA).
18In practice, the length between dates will vary slightly depending on the day-count convention. To simplify
notation, we suppress this dependence.
19We thank Fabio Mercurio for discussions about basis swap market conventions.
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More specifically, consider the tenor structure (6) with ∆ = Ti − Ti−1.20 At every time Ti,
i = 1, ..., N , one party pays ∆K, while the other party pays ∆L(Ti−1, Ti), where L(Ti−1, Ti)






(1 + (tj − tj−1)L(tj−1, tj))− 1
 , (9)
where Ti−1 = t0 < t1 < · · · < tKi = Ti denotes the partition of the period [Ti−1, Ti] into
Ki business days, and L(tj−1, tj) denotes the respective overnight rate. As in Andersen and
Piterbarg (2010, Section 5.5), we approximate simple by continuous compounding and the












The OIS rate is the value of K that makes the OIS value equal to zero at inception and is
given by
















In both the USD and EUR markets, OIS payments occur at a 1Y frequency, i.e. ∆ = 1. For
OISs with maturities less than one year, there is only one payment at maturity.
2.6 The IRS-OIS spread
Combining (7) and (11), a few calculations yield














This equation shows that the spread between the rates on, say, a 5Y IRS indexed to δ-
maturity LIBOR and a 5Y OIS reflects (risk-neutral) expectations about future δ-maturity
LIBOR-OIS spreads during the next 5 years.21 To the extent that the LIBOR-OIS spread
20In contrast to an IRS, an OIS typically has fixed-rate payments and floating-rate payments occurring at
the same frequency.
21Note that (12) only holds true if the fixed payments are made with the same frequency in the two swaps,
which is the case in the EUR market but not in the USD market. For the more general case, suppose that the
payments in the OIS are made on the tenor structure t = T ′0 < T
′
1 < · · · < T
′
n′ = T , with ∆
′ = T ′i −T
′
i−1. Then












In the USD market, where ∆ = 1/2 and ∆′ = 1, w(t) is always very close to one and (12) holds up to a very
small approximation error.
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measures short-term interbank risk, the IRS-OIS spread reflects expectations about future
short-term interbank risks – more specifically, about short-term interbank risks among the
banks that constitute the LIBOR panel at future tenor dates, which may vary due to the
periodic updating of the LIBOR panel. Consequently, we refer to the term structure of IRS-
OIS spreads as the term structure of interbank risk.
2.7 Credit default swaps (CDS)
In a credit default swap (CDS), counterparties exchange a stream of coupon payments for a
single default protection payment in the event of default by a reference entity. As such, the
swap comprises a premium leg (the coupon stream) and a protection leg (the contingent default
protection payment). More specifically, consider the tenor structure (5) and let τ denote the
default time of the reference entity.22 The present value of the premium leg with coupon rate
C is given by
Vprem(t, T ) = C I1(t, T ) + C I2(t, T ),
where C I1(t, T ) with








t rc(s)ds(ti − ti−1)1{ti<τ}
]
(13)
is the value of the coupon payments prior to default time τ , and C I2(t, T ) with












is the accrued coupon payment at default time τ . The present value of the protection leg is










where R(τ) denotes the recovery rate at default time τ . The CDS spread, CDS(t, T ), is the
value of C that makes the premium and protection leg equal in value at inception and is given
22CDS contracts are traded with maturity dates falling on one of four roll dates, March 20, June 20, September
20, or December 20. At initiation, therefore, the actual time to maturity of a CDS contract will be close to, but
rarely the same as, the specified time to maturity. Coupon payments are made on a quarterly basis coinciding
with the CDS roll dates.
13
by23
CDS(t, T ) =
Vprot(t, T )
I1(t, T ) + I2(t, T )
.
3 Modeling the term structure of interbank risk
We describe our model of the term structure of interbank risk. We first consider the general
framework and then specialize to a tractable model with analytical pricing formulas.
3.1 The general framework
Rather than modeling the funding costs of individual panel banks, we consider an average
bank which represents the panel at a given point in time. More specifically, we assume the
extended doubly stochastic framework provided in Appendix B below, where for any t0 ≥ 0,
the default time of an average bank within the t0-panel is modeled by some random time
τ(t0) > t0. This default time admits a nonnegative intensity process λ(t0, t), for t > t0, with
initial value λ(t0, t0) = Λ(t0). In other words, at a given point in time t > t0, Λ(t) is the
average default intensity of the current t-panel, while λ(t0, t) is the default intensity of an
average bank within the initial t0-panel.
In view of the doubly stochastic property (39), the time t0-value of an unsecured loan with
notional 1 to an average bank within the t0-panel over period [t0, T ] equals


















Note that here we assume zero recovery of interbank loans, which is necessary to keep the
subsequent affine transform analysis tractable.24 Absent market frictions, the (T−t0)-maturity
LIBOR rate L(t0, T ) satisfies 1 + (T − t0)L(t0, T ) = 1/B(t0, T ).
In practice, LIBOR may be affected by factors not directly related to default risk. For in-
stance, banks may refrain from lending long-term for precautionary reasons as in the models of
Allen, Carletti, and Gale (2009) and Acharya and Skeie (2010), or for speculative reasons as in
23While these “par spreads” are quoted in the market, CDS contracts have been executed since 2009 with a
standardized coupon and an upfront payment to compensate for the difference between the par spread and the
coupon. However, our CDS database consists of par spreads throughout the sample period.
24Alternatively, we could follow Duffie and Singleton (1999) and let λ(t0, s) = h(t0, s)l(t0, s) be the product
of a default intensity process, h(t0, s), and a fractional default loss process, l(t0, s). That is, l(t0, s) ∈ [0, 1]
defines the fraction of market value of the loan that is lost upon default.
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the models of Acharya, Gromb, and Yorulmazer (2007), Acharya, Shin, and Yorulmazer (2010),
and Diamond and Rajan (2010). Either way, the volume of longer term interbank loans de-
creases and the rates on such loans increase beyond the levels justified by default risk. We
allow for a non-default component in LIBOR by setting








Ξ(t0, T ), (17)
where Ξ(t0, T ) is a multiplicative residual term that satisfies
lim
T→t0
Ξ(t0, T ) = 1.










Ξ(t0, T ) = −
d
dT
B(t0, T )|T=t0 = r(t0) + Λ(t0). (18)
Combining (11) (in the case of a single payment) and (17), we get the following expression
for the LIBOR-OIS spread




















The first bracketed term in (19) is the default component. The periodic updating of the
LIBOR panel implies that λ(t0, t) ≥ Λ(t), for t > t0. From (16) and (3) in conjunction with
(18) it follows that B(t0, T ) > Pc(t0, T ), which implies that the default component is positive.
The second bracketed term in (19) is the non-default component, which is positive provided
that Ξ(t0, T ) > 1.
For the analysis, we also need expressions for the CDS spreads of an average bank within
the t0-panel. The factors I1(t0, T ) and I2(t0, T ) in the present value of the premium leg given
in (13) and (14) become

























































λ(t0,s)dsλ(t0, u) is the F∞∨Ht0 -
conditional density function of τ (t0), see e.g. Filipovic´ (2009, Section 12.3).
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In line with the assumption of zero recovery of interbank loans in the derivation of (16), we
shall assume zero recovery for the CDS protection leg. Its present value (15) thus becomes




















3.2 An affine factor model
We now introduce an affine factor model of r(t), the intensities Λ(t) and λ(t0, t), and the
residual Ξ(t0, T ). We assume that the risk-free short rate, r(t), is driven by a two-factor
Gaussian process26
dr(t) = κr(γ(t)− r(t)) dt + σr dWr(t)








where γ(t) is the stochastic mean-reversion level of r(t), and ρ is the correlation between
innovations to r(t) and γ(t).
We have investigated several specifications for the average default intensity of the period-
ically refreshed panel, Λ(t). In the interest of parsimony, we assume that Λ(t) is constant
Λ(t) ≡ Λ.
In Section 6, we analyze a setting, where Λ(t) is stochastic. This adds complexity to the model
without materially affecting the results.
The default intensity of an average bank within the t0-panel, λ(t0, t), is modeled by
λ(t0, t) = Λ +
∫ t
t0




where N(t) is a simple counting process with jump intensity ν(t) and Zλ,1, Zλ,2, . . . are i.i.d.
exponential jump sizes with mean 1
ζλ
. That is, we assume that deterioration in the credit
quality of an average bank within the t0-panel relative to the average credit quality of the
periodically refreshed panel occurs according to a jump process. The first jump time of λ(t0, t)
is interpreted as the time, when the bank is dropped from the panel. Between jumps, we allow
for λ(t0, t) to mean-revert towards Λ.
27
26The model is equally tractable with r(t) being driven by a two-factor square-root process. While this may
seem more appropriate given the low interest rate environment during much of the sample period, we found
that the fit to the OIS term structure is slightly worse with this specification. Nevertheless, the decomposition
of the term structure of interbank risk is almost identical for two specifications.
27In Section 6, we explore an alternative specification, where deterioration in credit quality is permanent.
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The intensity of credit quality deterioration, ν(t), is stochastic and evolves according to
either a one-factor square-root process
dν(t) = κν(θν − ν(t)) dt + σν
√
ν(t) dWν(t), (25)
or a two-factor square-root process
dν(t) = κν(µ(t)− ν(t)) dt + σν
√
ν(t) dWν(t)




where µ(t) is the stochastic mean-reversion level of ν(t).












where ξ(t) evolves according to either a one-factor square-root process
dξ(t) = κξ(θξ − ξ(t)) dt + σξ
√
ξ(t) dWξ(t), (28)
or a two-factor square-root process
dξ(t) = κξ(ǫ(t)− ξ(t)) dt + σξ
√
ξ(t) dWξ(t)




where ǫ(t) is the stochastic mean-reversion level of ξ(t).
In the following, we will use the notation A(X,Y,Z) to denote a specification where r(t),
ν(t), and ξ(t) are driven by X, Y , and Z factors, respectively. We analyze three progressively
more complex model specifications: A(2,1,1), where the state vector is given by (23), (25), and
(28), A(2,2,1), where the state vector is given by (23), (26), and (28), and A(2,2,2), where the
state vector is given by (23), (26), and (29). All specifications have analytical pricing formulas
for LIBOR, OIS, IRS, and CDS. These formulas are given in Appendix C, which also contains
sufficient admissability conditions on the parameter values (Lemma C.4).
For the empirical part, we also need the dynamics of the state vector under the objective
probability measure P ∼ Q. Given our relatively short sample period, we assume a parsimo-














28We specify Ξ(t0, T ) to be non-decreasing in T . This is consistent with the economic fact that in the
absence of negative rates the non-annualized LIBOR, (T − t0)L(t0, T ), which in our framework (17) factorizes






Ξ(t0, T ), is non-decreasing in T .
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4 Data and estimation
We estimate the model on a panel data set that covers the period starting with the onset of
the credit crisis on August 09, 2007 and ending on January 12, 2011. We do not include the
pre-crisis period, given that a regime switch in the perception of interbank risk appear to have
occurred at the onset of the crisis, see Figure 1.
4.1 Interest rate data
The interest rate data is from Bloomberg. We collect daily OIS rates with maturities 3M, 6M,
1Y, 2Y, 3Y, 4Y, 5Y, 7Y, and 10Y.30 We also collect daily IRS and BS rates with maturities
of 1Y, 2Y, 3Y, 4Y, 5Y, 7Y, and 10Y as well as 3M and 6M LIBOR and EURIBOR rates.
The rates on OIS, IRS, and BS are composite quotes computed from quotes that Bloomberg
collects from major banks and inter-dealer brokers.
In the USD market, the benchmark IRS is indexed to 3M LIBOR (with fixed-rate payments
occurring at a 6M frequency), and the rate on an IRS indexed to 6M LIBOR is obtained via
a BS as
IRS6M,6M(t, T ) = IRS3M,6M (t, T ) +BS3M,6M(t, T ). (31)
Conversely, in the EUR market, the benchmark IRS is indexed to 6M EURIBOR (with fixed-
rate payments occurring at a 1Y frequency), and the rate on an IRS indexed to 3M EURIBOR
is obtained via a BS as
IRS3M,1Y (t, T ) = IRS6M,1Y (t, T )−BS3M,6M (t, T ). (32)
In the paper, we focus on the spreads between rates on IRS and OIS with the same
maturities. Therefore, for each currency and on each day in the sample, we have two spread
29We charge no explicit premium for the jump intensity and size risk of λ(t0, t) in (24).
30In Bloomberg, there is no USD 7Y OIS rate. Also, the time series for the USD 10Y OIS rate starts July
28, 2008.
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term structures given by
SPREADδ(t, T ) = IRSδ,∆(t, T )−OIS(t, T ), (33)
for δ = 3M or δ = 6M and ∆ = 6M (1Y) in the USD (EUR) market.
Table 1 shows summary statistics of the data. For a given maturity, interest rate spreads
are always increasing in the tenor (the maturity of the LIBOR rate to which an IRS is indexed).
This is consistent with the idea that a 6M LIBOR loan contains more default and liquidity risk
than two consecutive 3M LIBOR loans. For a given tenor, the mean and volatility of spreads
decrease with maturity. While the mean spreads are similar across the two markets, spread
volatility tends to be higher in the USD market.
4.2 CDS spread data
The CDS data is from Markit, which is the leading provider of CDS quotes. Markit collects
quotes from major market participants and constructs daily composite quotes. Since data
supplied by Markit is widely used for marking-to-market CDS contracts, its quotes are closely
watched by market participants. For each bank in the LIBOR and EURIBOR panels, we
collect daily spread term structures for CDS contracts written on senior obligations. The term
structures consist of 6M, 1Y, 2Y, 3Y, 4Y, 5Y, 7Y, and 10Y maturities.
Tables 2 and 3 shows summary statistics for the CDS spreads of the constituents of the
LIBOR and EURIBOR panels, respectively.31 The tables also show the currency of the CDS
contracts32, the size of the banks’ balance sheets as reported in the 2009 annual reports, a
measure of liquidity of the CDS contracts, and the date from which CDS data is available in
the Markit database.
31During our sample period, there were no revisions to the LIBOR and EURIBOR panels. As mentioned in
Section 2.1, the EURIBOR panel consisted of 42 banks. Three of the smaller panel banks – Bank of Ireland,
Banque et Caisse d’Epargne de l’Etat, and Confederacion Espanola de Cajas de Ahorros – were not in the
Markit database.
32For European-based banks, the CDS contracts in the database supplied by Markit are denominated in
EUR and subject to the Modified-Restructuring (MR) clause. For US-based banks, the CDS contracts are
denominated in USD and subject to the MR clause until Dec 31, 2008 and the No-Restructuring (XR) clause
thereafter. Finally, for Japan-based banks, the CDS contracts are denominated in JPY until Dec 31, 2008
and USD thereafter, and are subject to the Complete-Restructuring (CR) clause. Even though the currency
denomination differs across CDS contracts, the CDS spreads are expressed as a rate and are, therefore, free of
units of account.
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Our measure of liquidity is the average daily trading volume in terms of notional, as
reported by the Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation (DTCC), a global repository that
records the details of virtually all CDS trades in the global market. The data covers the period
from June 20, 2009 to March 19, 2011 (data was not available prior to this period) and only
includes trading activity that involves a transfer of risk between market participants. Also,
the data only covers the top 1000 reference entities (in terms of the notional of outstanding
contracts) and some banks, particularly from the EURIBOR panel, are not covered (or only
covered during parts of the period, in which case we also do not report numbers).
We see that the LIBOR panel mainly consists of very large banks with significant trading
activity in their CDS contracts, although it also includes some medium-sized banks for which
the CDS contracts are traded less actively. For the EURIBOR panel, there is a larger cross-
sectional dispersion of the size of the member banks and the trading activity in their CDS
contracts, which is natural given that the panel consists of significantly more banks than the
LIBOR panel.
4.3 Measures of interbank default risk
To measure interbank default risk, we initially assume that CDS spreads are pure measures of
the default risk of the underlying entities. At each point in time, we construct a CDS spread
term structure for an average bank within the panel as a composite of the CDS spread term
structures for the individual panel banks.
The LIBOR panel As discussed in Section 2.1, LIBOR is a trimmed mean of the rates at
which banks estimate they can obtain unsecured funding for a given term. Since the submitted
rates depend on the banks’ own default risks, LIBOR itself presumably reflects a trimmed mean
of the default risks of the panel banks. Therefore, we measure the default risk of an average
bank within the LIBOR panel by aggregating the CDS spreads of the individual LIBOR panel
banks in the same way that LIBOR is computed from the submitted rates, namely by removing
the top and bottom 25 percent of spreads and computing a simple average of the remaining
spreads. The resulting default risk measure is denoted CDSTrMean.
The EURIBOR panel As we also discussed in Section 2.1, EURIBOR is a trimmed mean
of the rates at which banks estimate a prime bank (not necessarily themselves) can obtain
unsecured funding for a given term. While the notion of a prime bank is ambiguous, we
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interpret it as a representative bank among the panel. Since the median rather than the mean
seems to be the appropriate statistics in this case, it is plausible that the submitted rates
reflect what each bank perceives is the median default risk in the panel. Being a trimmed
mean of the submitted rates, EURIBOR itself then also reflects the median default risk in
the panel. Therefore, we measure the default risk of an average bank within the EURIBOR
panel by taking the median of the CDS spreads of the individual EURIBOR panel banks. We
denote this default risk measure CDSMedian.
Correcting for possible liquidity effects The assumption that CDS spreads are pure
measures of default risk is made in several papers, including Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis (2005),
Blanco, Brennan, and Marsh (2005), Beber, Brandt, and Kavajecz (2009), and Ang and
Longstaff (2011). However, a number of recent papers have found that CDS spreads may
be affected by liquidity effects. For instance, Buhler and Trapp (2010) find that, on average,
95 percent of the observed mid CDS spread is due to default risk, while the remaining is due
to liquidity risk and the correlation between default and liquidity risk. This implies that the
premium due to liquidity is earned by the seller of default protection and that CDS spreads
are upward-biased measures of default risk. Similar results are reached by Bongaerts, de Jong,
and Driessen (2011) and others.
In the case of LIBOR, liquidity may be less of an issue since the panel mainly consists of
banks with relatively liquid CDS contracts, and since we use a trimmed mean of the individual
CDS spreads, which reduces the effect of idiosyncratic noise at the level of the individual
spreads. In the case of EURIBOR, where there is larger cross-sectional dispersion in the
liquidity of the banks’ CDS contracts, and where we work with a median spread, liquidity
issues may be more important.
For both panels, we consider two alternative measures of default risks that correct for
possible liquidity effects. First, we measure default risk by 90 percent of the composite CDS
spreads, corresponding to a situation where protection sellers earn a significant liquidity pre-
mium. Given the results in Buhler and Trapp (2010), this is likely to be a lower bound on
the default component of CDS spreads. Second, we measure default risk by constructing the
composite CDS spreads as described above, but only using data from those banks where the
average daily notional of CDS transactions are larger than 50 million USD equivalent.33 In
33To put these numbers into perspective, we computed summary statistics for the trading activity among the
top 1000 reference entities that were not sovereigns. On a quarterly basis, the median varies between 15.0 and
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each market, the two alternative default risk measures are denoted CDSLIQ1 and CDSLIQ2.
iTraxx Senior Financials index As an alternative to computing composite CDS spreads
from the panel constituents, for the EUR market we also consider the iTraxx Senior Financials
CDS index. This index is quoted directly in the market and tracks the spreads on CDS
contracts written on senior obligations of 25 large European financial institutions. The index
tends to be more liquid than the individual contracts, but clearly both its construction and the
fact that some of the underlying institutions are not part of EURIBOR34 makes it an imperfect
measure of the default risk inherent in EURIBOR. Also, it is only available for maturities of
5Y and 10Y. Nevertheless, it serves as an interesting robustness check.
Summary statistics Table 1 shows summary statistics of the composite CDS spreads. On
average, the level of CDS spreads increase with maturity, while CDS spread volatility de-
crease with maturity. In the USD market, we have, on average, CDSLIQ1 < CDSTrMean <
CDSLIQ2, while in the EURmarket, we have, on average, CDSLIQ1 < CDSLIQ2 < CDSMedian <
CDSiT raxx. The magnitudes of CDSTrMean in the USD market and CDSMedian in the EUR
market are rather similar despite the EURIBOR panel being composed of significantly more
banks than the LIBOR panel.
Our main sets of results will be based on the original default risk measures, while in
Section 6 we investigate the sensitivity of the results to taking possible CDS liquidity effects
into account.
4.4 Maximum-likelihood estimation
We estimate the specifications using maximum-likelihood in conjunction with Kalman filtering.
Due to the non-linearities in the relation between observations and state variables, we apply
the non-linear unscented Kalman filter, which is found by Christoffersen et al. (2009) to have
very good finite-sample properties in the context of estimating dynamic term structure models
with swap rates. Details on the estimation approach are provided in Appendix D.
In terms of identification, we face several issues. First, we show in the online appendix that
20.8 million USD, while the mean varies between 25.0 and 33.6 million USD. With a cutoff of 50 million USD,
we are clearly focusing on the most liquid segment of the CDS market.
34For instance, for the iTraxx series 14, launched in September 2010, 14 of the 25 financial institutions were
also members of the EURIBOR panel.
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it is very difficult to separately identify ζλ (with
1
ζλ
being the mean jump size in the default
intensity) and the process for ν(t) (the intensity of credit quality deterioration). Rather, it is
the mean rate of credit quality deterioration of an average panel bank, 1
ζλ
ν(t), that matters
for valuation. In the estimation, we fix ζλ at 10, but the implied process for the mean rate of
credit quality deterioration is invariant to the choice of ζλ.
Second, in a preliminary analysis, we find that it is difficult to reliably estimate the default
intensity of the periodically refreshed panel, Λ. Its value is not identified from the OIS term
structure and, in the absence of very short-term CDS spreads, is also hard to pin down from
the CDS term structure. From (4) and (18), we have that Λ is the difference between the
instantaneous proxy of the overnight unsecured interbank rate, L(t, t), and the truly risk-free
rate, r(t). Therefore, one can get an idea about the magnitude of Λ by examining the spread
between short-term OIS rates and repo rates, which are virtually riskfree due to the practice
of overcollateralization of repo loans; see, e.g., Longstaff (2000). The sample averages of the
1W OIS-repo spreads for Treasury, Agency, Agency MBS, and European general collateral
are 13 bp, 3 bp, -1 bp, and 0 bp, respectively.35 ,36 Plots of these spreads can be found in the
online appendix. In the case of Treasury collateral, the spread spikes at the beginning of the
crisis and around the Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers episodes. However, movements in
the spread likely reflect periodic scarcity of Treasury collateral, rather than variation in default
risk, since the spikes are mostly due to downward spikes in the Treasury repo rate rather than
upward spikes in the OIS rate. Also, the correlation between the OIS-Treasury repo spread
and short-maturity (6M) bank CDS spreads is virtually zero.37 In the cases of Agency and
Agency MBS collateral, the spreads are volatile in the first half of the sample period, but
without systematic patterns around crisis events, while in the case of the EUR market, the
35For the EUR market, we use the Eurepo rate, which is a benchmark reflecting the rate on interbank
borrowing secured by “the best collateral within the most actively traded European repo market.”
36Similar results are obtained by examining the spreads between FF and overnight repo rates for Treasury,
Agency, and Agency MBS general collateral as well as the spread between EONIA and the overnight Eurepo
rate. The sample averages of these spreads are 15 bp, 5 bp, 2 bp, and 1 bp, respectively. Since overnight rates
are highly volatile with predictable liquidity-driven jumps (see, e.g., Bartolini et al. (2011)), we believe the 1W
OIS-repo spreads are more informative.
37In their analysis of the repo market, Hordahl and King (2008) also notes scarcity of Treasury collateral as
the main factor driving repo spreads: “As the available supply of Treasury collateral dropped, those market
participants willing to lend out Treasuries were able to borrow cash at increasingly cheap rates. At times, this
effect pushed US GC repo rates down to levels only a few basis points above zero”.
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spread is very stable throughout the sample period. Taken together, these results suggest that
there is very little default risk in the market for overnight interbank deposits. We fix Λ at 5
bp, but reasonable variations in the value of Λ do not change our results. In Section 6, we
show that our results are robust to extending the model with a stochastic Λ(t) identified via
OIS-Treasury repo spreads.
Third, given the relatively short sample period, many of the market price of risk parameters
are imprecisely estimated (in contrasts to the risk-neutral parameters, most of which are
strongly identified with low standard errors). For each model specification, we obtain a more
parsimonious risk premium structure by reestimating the model after setting to zero those
market price of risk parameters for which the absolute t-statistics did not exceed one.38 The




Table 4 displays parameter estimates and their asymptotic standard errors.39 The estimates
are strikingly similar across the two markets and, therefore, we focus on the USD estimates.
In the A(2,2,1) and A(2,2,2) specifications, ν(t) is relatively volatile and displays fast mean-
reversion towards µ(t), which in turn is less volatile and has much slower mean-reversion.
Hence, ν(t) captures transitory shocks to the intensity of credit quality deterioration, while
µ(t) captures more persistent shocks. In the A(2,1,1) specification, the speed of mean-reversion
and volatility lie between those of ν(t) and µ(t) in the more general specifications. Also,
between jumps, the reversion of the default intensity towards Λ occurs relatively fast. Although
estimated with some uncertainty, the market prices of risk Γν and Γµ are negative in all
specifications. This implies that the long-run mean of credit quality deterioration is lower under
the physical measure than under the risk-neutral measure, indicating that market participants
require a premium for bearing exposure to variation in default risk.40 We return to this issue
38A similar approach is taken by Duffee (2002) and Dai and Singleton (2002) and others.
39It is straightforward to verify that for all the specifications, the parameter values satisfy the sufficient
admissability conditions in Lemma C.4 in the Appendix.
40In the A(2,1,1) specification, the long-run mean under the physical measure is given by θνκν/(κν − σνΓν),
while in the A(2,2,1) and A(2,2,2) specifications, it is given by θµκνκµ/ [(κν − σνΓν)(κµ − σµΓµ)].
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in Section 5.6.
In all specifications, the residual factor, ξ(t), is very volatile, exhibits very fast mean-
reversion, and has a long-run mean of essentially zero. In the A(2,2,2) specifications, ξ(t)
is mean-reverting towards ǫ(t) which is less volatile and has slower mean-reversion. Hence,
ξ(t) captures transitory shocks to the non-default component, while ǫ(t) captures moderately
persistent shocks. In none of the specifications, were we able to reliably estimate Γξ and Γǫ.
Consequently, these parameters were constrained to zero in our two-step estimation procedure.
5.2 State variables
Figure 2 displays the state variables for the three specifications estimated on USD data. The
corresponding figure for the EUR market is similar and available in the online appendix. It
is instructive to see the reaction of the state variables to the three most important shocks to
the interbank money market during the sample period: the Bear Stearns near-bankruptcy on
March 16, 2008, the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy on September 15, 2008, and the escalation
of the European sovereign debt crisis often marked by the downgrade of Greece’s debt to non-
investment grade status by Standard and Poor’s on April 27, 2010. The figure shows that ν(t)
increases leading up to the Bear Stearns near-default but quickly decreases after the take-over
by J.P. Morgan. If anything, the opposite is true of ξ(t). Immediately following the Lehman
default, ξ(t) spikes while ν(t) increases more gradually and does not reach its maximum until
March 2009. Finally, with the escalation of the European sovereign debt crisis, ν(t) increases
while ξ(t) does not react. These dynamics hold true regardless of the model specification and
suggest that an increase in the risk of credit quality deterioration was the main factor driving
interbank risk around the first and third episode, while an increase in risk factors not directly
related to default risk was the main driver in the aftermath of the Lehman default.
In order to better interpret the model’s implications for current and future interbank default
risk, we compute risk-neutral 3M and 6M expected default probabilities (EDPs) for an average
bank within the current panel as well as for an average bank within the refreshed panel in five
year’s time.41 These are displayed in Figure 3 for the USD market, with the corresponding
figure for the EUR market available in the online appendix. Taking the A(2,2,1) specification
as an example, over our sample period, the spot 3M EDP averaged 0.09 percent but peaked at








, where ∆ equals 3M or 6M and T
equals t plus 5Y. Both expressions have analytical solutions in our affine framework.
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0.32 percent in March 2009 (Panel A2). Because of mean-reversion in the intensity of credit
quality deterioration, the forward 3M EDP is much less volatile, averaging 0.07 percent and
peaking at 0.11 percent.42 Until the Lehman Brothers default, the term structure of EDPs
was mostly upward-sloping, implying that risk-neutral expectations were for interbank default
risk to increase in the future. This contrasts with the downward-sloping spread term structure
during this period (Figure 1), indicating an important role for non-default risk factors in
determining short-term spreads. From the Lehman Brothers default until Fall 2009, the term
structure of EDPs was downward-sloping, while it is again mostly upward-sloping during the
last part of the sample period.
Similar dynamics are observed for the 6M EDPs (Panel B2). Note that the risk of credit
quality deterioration combined with the potential for “refreshment” of the LIBOR panel implies
that a strategy of lending for 6M to a LIBOR counterparty involves more default risk than
lending for two consecutive 3M periods, as the latter strategy includes the option of switching
to a more creditworthy counterparty after 3M. Indeed, the spot 6M EDP is consistently larger
than the sum of the spot 3M EDP and the 3M forward 3M EDP for a refreshed panel. The
sample mean of the former is 0.27 percent, while the sample mean of the latter sum is only
0.17 percent.
5.3 Specification analysis
For each of the model specifications, we compute the fitted OIS rates, interest rate spreads,
and CDS spreads based on the filtered state variables. For each day in the sample and within
each category – OIS, SPREAD3M , SPREAD6M , and CDS – we then compute the root
mean squared pricing errors (RMSEs) of the available rates or spreads, thereby constructing
time series of RMSEs.
The first three rows of Panel A in Table 5 display the means of the RMSE time series
in the USD market. The next two rows report the mean difference in RMSEs between two
model specifications along with the associated t-statistics. Given that all specifications have
two factors driving the OIS term structure, they obviously produce almost the same fit to OIS
rates. However, they differ significantly in their fit to interest rate spreads and CDS spreads.
A(2,2,1) has a significantly better fit than A(2,1,1) to the CDS term structure, with the mean
42Obviously, the expected default probabilities depend on our assumption of zero recovery (or 100% loss rate).
As a rule of thumb, halving the loss rate is nearly the same as doubling the expected default probabilities.
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RMSE decreasing from 11.6 bp to 6.6 bp. It also appears to trade off a statistically significant
better fit to the term structure of swap spreads indexed to 6M LIBOR, for a statistically
insignificant worse fit to the term structure of swap spreads indexed to 3M LIBOR. A(2,2,2)
improves upon A(2,2,1) with a statistically significant better fit to the term structures of CDS
spreads and swap spreads indexed to 6M LIBOR, and a marginally statistically significant
better fit to the term structure of swap spreads indexed to 3M LIBOR. Economically, however,
the improvement of A(2,2,2) over A(2,2,1) is modest (about 0.5 bp in terms of average RMSEs),
and we do not expect more elaborate models to perform much better.
Panel B in Table 5 display the results for the EUR market, which are similar to those
obtained for the USD market.43 In general, the model tends to have a slightly better fit to the
EUR data than the USD data. This is also apparent from Table 4 where, for each specification,
the estimated variance on the pricing errors is smaller for the EUR market.
More information about pricing errors are provided in the online appendix, where we
display RMSEs for each point on the term structures of OIS rates, interest rate spreads, and
CDS spreads. For the A(2,2,1) and A(2,2,2) specifications, the fit is generally rather uniform
along the term structures, although in some cases we observe a deterioration in the fit at very
short or very long maturities – an issue that is often encountered in term structure modeling.44
Since we value parsimony, in the following we will use the A(2,2,1) specification to analyze
the term structure of interbank risk in more detail.
5.4 Decomposing the term structure of interbank risk
We measure the default component as the hypothetical swap spread that would materialize
if default risk were the only risk factor in the interbank money market. This is computed by
43The main difference is that for the EUR market, the more elaborate specifications generate an improvement
in the fit to the OIS term structure, which is statistically significant if still economically small.
44In our model, we assume that the OIS reference rate equals the average cost of unsecured overnight funding
for LIBOR panel banks, which implies that the LIBOR-OIS spread goes to zero as maturity goes to zero. In
principle, an interesting out-of-sample test of the model is the extent to which very short term LIBOR-OIS
spreads implied by the model correspond to those observed in the data. In practice, however, very short-term
LIBOR-OIS spreads are extremely noisy and display little correlation with longer term spreads. For instance, in
the USD market, the shortest LIBOR maturity is overnight and the correlation between changes in the overnight
LIBOR-FF spread and changes in the 3M and 6M LIBOR-OIS spreads are 0.08 and -0.01, respectively. One
would need to add additional factors to the model to capture the largely idiosyncratic behavior at the very
short end of the spread curve.
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setting the residual term to one, Ξ(t0, T ) = 1. The non-default component is then given by
the difference between the fitted swap spread and the default-induced swap spread.
Table 6 displays, for each maturity, summary statistics of the two components. Focus
first on the USD market. Panel A1 shows the decomposition of swap spreads indexed to 3M
LIBOR. At the short end of the term structure, the default component is, on average, slightly
smaller than the non-default component. As maturity increases, the default component, on
average, first decreases and then increases for maturities beyond 4 years. On the other hand,
the non-default component, on average, decreases rapidly with maturity. The upshot is that, as
maturity increases, default increasingly becomes the dominant component. Panel A2 shows the
decomposition of swap spreads indexed to 6M LIBOR. At the short end of the term structure,
the default component is, on average, larger than the non-default component. Otherwise, the
pattern is the same, with default increasingly becoming the dominant component as maturity
increases.
Another observation from Table 6 is that both components are very volatile, particularly
at the short end of the term structure. Figure 4 displays the time-series of the default and
non-default components of the 3M and 6M LIBOR-OIS spreads (Panels A and B) and the 5Y
swap spreads indexed to 3M or 6M LIBOR (Panels C and D). Consider first the money market
spreads. Prior to the Lehman default, the default component constitutes a relatively small part
of spreads, except for a brief period around the Bear Stearns near-default. In the aftermath of
the Lehman default, the non-default component increases rapidly but then declines, while the
default component increases gradually. The result is that by March 2009 and for the rest of
the sample period, including the European sovereign debt crisis, spreads are almost exclusively
driven by the default component. Consider next the 5Y swap spreads. Clearly, default is the
overall more important component. Even prior to the Lehman default, the default component
is the dominant driver of spreads. Immediately after the Lehman default both the default and
non-default components increase after which the default component gradually becomes the
exclusive driver of spreads.
Focus next on the EUR market. The summary statistics of the default and non-default
components in Panels B1 and B2 in Table 6 are quite similar to those of the USD market.
However, comparing Figure 5 with Figure 4 shows that EUR interbank risk is generally lower
than USD interbank risk in the first half of the sample period, while the opposite is true in the
second half. This is consistent with the observation that banks’ exposures to US structured
credit products was an important source of interbank risk in the first half of the sample period,
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while their exposures to European sovereign debt was a major source of interbank risk in the
second half.
5.5 Understanding the non-default component
To understand the determinants of the non-default component, we investigate its relation
with funding liquidity and market liquidity, which tend to be highly interconnected; see, e.g.,
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009).
Funding liquidity Given its over-the-counter structure, we do not have liquidity proxies
that are specific to the market for unsecured interbank term funding.45 However, it is likely
that liquidity in this market is correlated with liquidity in the market for secured term funding,
which is another vital source of financing for banks. We consider two liquidity proxies for term
repos. The first proxy is the spread between the 3M Agency MBS general collateral (GC)
repo rate and the 3M Treasury GC repo rate. This measure reflects funding cost differentials
between securities that differ in their market liquidity.46 The second proxy is the Fontaine and
Garcia (2011) liquidity factor. This factor is estimated from the cross-section of on-the-run
premia for Treasuries, which in turn depend on the funding advantage (or “specialness”) of on-
the-run Treasuries in the repo market; see, e.g., Duffie (1996) and Jordan and Jordan (1997).
These liquidity proxies, denoted Reposprt and FGt, respectively, are displayed in Panels A
and B in Figure 6.
Government bond market liquidity We consider two proxies for government bond mar-
ket liquidity. The first proxy is the Hu, Pan, and Wang (2010) liquidity factor, which is a
daily aggregate of Treasury price deviations from “fair-value”. Their argument is that lower
liquidity allows more “noise” in the yield curve, as prices can deviate more from fundamental
values before arbitrageurs step in to profit from mis-valuations. The second proxy is the spread
between government bonds and government-sponsored agency bonds with lower liquidity but
45There does exist a trading platform for EUR interbank deposits, e-Mid. However, the maturities of the
traded deposits are almost exclusively overnight (see Angelini, Nobili, and Picillo (2009)), while we are interested
in liquidity measures for longer term deposits.
46In additional to wider spreads, larger initial margins (or “haircuts”) would also indicate lower repo market
liquidity. However, in contrasts to haircuts on structured product collateral, haircuts on Treasury and Agency
MBS collateral were fairly stable throughout the crisis; see, e.g., Copeland, Martin, and Walker (2010) and
Krishnamurthy, Nagel, and Orlov (2011).
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the same credit risk. Following Longstaff (2004), we use the spread between yields on Refcorp
bonds and off-the-run Treasuries (specifically, we use the 10Y par yield spread).47 These liq-
uidity proxies, denoted HPWt and RCsprt, respectively, are displayed in Panels C and D in
Figure 6.
Corporate bond market liquidity As proxies for corporate bond market liquidity, we use
the Dick-Nielsen, Feldhutter, and Lando (2012) liquidity factors. These factors are aggregates
of several bond-specific liquidity and liquidity risk measures. We consider both their liquidity
factor for the overall corporate bond market and their liquidity factor for bonds issued by
financial institutions. The latter liquidity factor is particularly interesting since bond issuance
(covered or uncovered) represents an important source of longer-term funding for banks. These
liquidity proxies are displayed in Panels E and F in Figure 6 and are denote DFLt and
DFLfint, respectively.
Approach We now relate the non-default component to these funding and market liquidity
proxies. As in the previous sections, we focus on the A(2,2,1) specification, where the non-
default component is driven by ξt. Since ξt captures the part of interbank risk that is unspanned
by default risk, the relevant question is the extent to which ξt is related to the parts of funding
and market liquidity, which are unspanned by default risk. For this reason, we first regress
the liquidity proxies on the first two principal components of the CDS term structure of the
panel.48 By construction, the regression residuals measure the variation in liquidity that is
orthogonal to default risk. We then regress ξt on these unspanned liquidity components.
Since FGt, HPWt, DFLt, and DFLfint are only available until December 31, 2009, we
use data up to this date in all regressions. Furthermore, since FGt, DFLt, and DFLfint are
only available at a monthly frequency, we run all regressions on monthly data.49 Finally, to
47In her analysis of the 3M Euribor-OIS spread, Schwartz (2010) uses a similar spread between yields on
KfW bonds (guaranteed by the German government) and German government bonds as a proxy for liquidity.
We have experimented with this spread (again, the 10Y par yield spread) in our analysis of the EUR market,
but found that the Refcorp-Treasury spread had better explanatory power.
48The first two principal components explain more than 99 percent of the variation in the CDS term structure
of the LIBOR and EURIBOR panels. Regressing on a larger number of principal components does not change
the results in any significant way.
49We convert daily time-series to monthly by averaging the daily observations over the month. This mirrors
the construction of DFLt, and DFLfint. Very similar results are obtained by using end-of-month observations.
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avoid spurious result due to the high persistence of the unspanned liquidity components, we
run the second-step regressions in first differences.50
Results Table 7 displays pairwise correlations between monthly changes in the unspanned
liquidity components and monthly changes in ξt. In general, the unspanned liquidity com-
ponents are moderately correlated, except for HPWt and RCsprt which are relatively highly
correlated, and DFLt and DFLfint which are almost perfectly correlated.
Table 8 displays results from univariate and multivariate regressions of monthly changes
in ξt on monthly changes in the unspanned liquidity components. Consider first the USD
market (Panel A of Table 8). In the univariate regressions, the coefficients on all the liquidity
proxies are positive. FGt is marginally significant, DFLt and DFLfint are significant at
conventional levels, and the rest are highly significant. Adjusted R2s lie between 0.10 and
0.49. In a multivariate regression with all liquidity proxies except DFLfint,
51 the adjusted
R2 increases to 0.62 but, due to multicollinearity, several of the liquidity proxies become
insignificant and have the wrong sign. Removing the least significant regressors results in a
specification with only Reposprt and RCsprt, both highly significant, and an adjusted R
2 of
0.64.
Consider next the EUR market (Panel B of Table 8). The results are generally consistent
with those of the USD market. In the univariate regressions the adjusted R2s vary between
0.03 and 0.44, with all but the two corporate bond liquidity proxies being significant. In the
regression specification with only Reposprt and RCsprt, both are highly significant and the
adjusted R2 reaches 0.70.
Taken together, the results lend support to the conjecture that the non-default component
of interbank risk largely captures liquidity effects not spanned by default risk.
5.6 Pricing of interbank risk
The model allows us to estimate the compensation that market participants require for bearing
interbank risk. These results are necessarily tentative, since the relatively short sample period
implies that the market price of risk parameters are estimated with some uncertainty.
50Unit root tests are available upon request.
51We only include one of the corporate bond liquidity proxies in the multivariate regression, because of their
near-perfect correlation.
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When discussing risk premia, it is important to distinguish between the swap market and
the unsecured interbank money market. In both markets, there are premia associated with
interest rate risk, variation in default risk, and unspanned liquidity risk. These premia are
captured by the market prices of risk on the Wiener processes. However, in the unsecured
interbank market, there is also a jump risk premium on the default event itself (to the extent
that the mean loss rate differs under the objective and risk-neutral measures, see Yu (2002)
and Jarrow, Lando, and Yu (2005)). Since our data set does not allow us to estimate the
default event risk premium, we will focus on the risk premia that are available in the swap
market.
As we are interested in the compensation for exposure to interbank risk, we consider a
swap spread strategy consisting of receiving the fixed rate in an IRS indexed to 3M LIBOR
and paying the fixed rate in an OIS of the same maturity. This strategy is expected to be
approximately delta-neutral with respect to pure interest rate risk. The time-t value of the








t denote the time-t values of an IRS
and OIS, respectively, from the perspective of the party who receives the fixed rate and pays
the floating rate. The risk-neutral dynamics of the marked-to-market value of this strategy
are given by52









































. Hence, the strategy has an almost pure exposure to interbank risk. With the market


























Figure 7 displays time-series of SRSPRt at the 1Y, 5Y, and 10Y swap maturities in the
USD (results for the EUR market are similar). Due to their fast mean-reversion, ν(t) and
ξ(t) mainly affect near-term forward LIBOR rates. This implies that, for maturities beyond
approximately one year, the spread strategy’s loadings on Wν(t) and Wξ(t) have very little
dependence on maturity. In contrast, µ(t) also impacts long-term forward LIBOR rates, and


























the spread strategy’s loading on Wµ(t) increases with maturity over the entire maturity range.
The sample averages of the market prices of risk on Wν(t) and Wµ(t) are -0.28 and -0.20,
respectively, while we are not able to reliably estimate the market price of risk on Wξ(t),
which is set to zero in our two-step estimation procedure, see end of Section 4.4. In the
first half of the sample period, where unspanned liquidity risk is an important component of
interbank risk, the strategy is primarily exposed to Wξ(t) for which there is no compensation.
This is particularly the case for short swap maturities. Therefore, Sharpe ratios are low and
increasing with swap maturity. The sole exceptions is the period around the Bear Stearns
near-bankruptcy, where default risk briefly became the main driver of interbank risk. In the
second half of the sample period, where default risk is the most important component of
interbank risk, the strategy is mainly exposed to Wν(t) and Wµ(t), and Sharpe ratios are,
therefore, larger during this period. For instance, the instantaneous Sharpe ratio at the 5Y
swap maturity is estimated to have averaged 0.35 from early 2009 to the end of the sample
period.53
6 Robustness checks
Most of the results in Section 5 are based on theA(2,2,1) specification along with theCDSTrMean
and CDSMedian measures of interbank default risk in the USD and EUR markets, respectively.
In this section, we investigate the robustness of our results to alternative model specifications
and interbank default risk measures. Throughout, we focus on the USD market and the swap
spread term structure indexed to 3M LIBOR. Decompositions are reported in Table 9, while
plots of the default and non-default components are available in the online appendix. Conclu-
sions for the spread term structure indexed to 6M LIBOR and for the EUR market are very
similar.54
53For comparison, prior to the credit crisis, Duarte, Longstaff, and Yu (2007) report realized Sharpe ratios
between 0.37 and 0.66, depending on maturity, on spread arbitrage strategies between IRS and Treasuries.
54For the EUR market, only in the case where we use CDSiTraxx to measure interbank default risk does the
results differ noticeable from the baseline results. To some extent, this is due to the imperfect overlap between
the set of underlying institutions in the iTraxx index and the EURIBOR panel. But primarily it is due to the
fact that the index is only available for maturities of 5Y and 10Y, leading to a less accurate identification of
the process driving the risk of credit quality deterioration.
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A(2,1,1) and A(2,2,2) We redo the decomposition of interbank risk using the A(2,1,1)
and A(2,2,2) specifications (Panels A and B, respectively, in Table 9). In both cases, the
decomposition is very similar to the original one (which, for ease of comparison, is reproduced
in the top panel in Table 9). One difference is that for the A(2,1,1) specification, the default
component at the short end of the term structure is somewhat less volatile, which is not
surprising given the one-factor nature of the risk of credit quality deterioration.
A(2,2,1) with κλ = 0 We explore the effect of assuming that shocks to the credit quality
of an average bank within the t0-panel are permanent, which corresponds to setting κλ = 0
in (24). We reestimate the A(2,2,1) specification subject to this constraint. The restricted
specification has a significantly worse fit to the data with the average RMSE for SPREAD3M ,
SPREAD6M , and CDSTrMean increasing to 13.36 bp, 11.72 bp, and 8.55 bp, respectively.
Consequently, we do not consider that specification in greater detail.
A(2,2,1) with stochastic Λ(t) Recall that the total default intensity of an average panel
bank depends on Λ(t) and the jump process representing credit quality deterioration, see (24).
If Λ(t) increases beyond the constant 5 bp that we have assumed so far, the effect of the jump
process has to decrease in order to still match a given level of CDS spreads. The model would
then imply a smaller default component in the LIBOR-OIS and IRS-OIS spreads.
To investigate this possibility, while keeping the model tractable, we assume the existence














where dWΛ˜(t) is another independent standard Brownian motion. Λ˜(t) generates variation in
Λ(t) and λ(t0, t) via




















That is, Λ(t) and λ(t0, t) fluctuate around the unobservable default risk factor. This specifica-
tion preserves the feature that λ(t0, t) and Λ(t) are identical until the first jump in λ(t0, t).
55
55The resulting pricing formulas are available upon request. Note that with κΛ = κλ and Λ˜(t) = Λ(t) = Λ
this model reduces to our baseline model.
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To identify the additional dimensions of the model, we add the 1W and 1M OIS-Treasury
repo spreads to our original data set. These spreads directly depend on the Λ(t)-process. As
discussed in Section 4.4, use of Treasury repo rates likely overstates Λ(t) and this analysis,
therefore, provides a lower bound on the effect of credit quality deterioration.56
The Λ˜(t)-process is volatile (σΛ˜ = 0.46), displays fast mean-reversion (κΛ˜ = 7.65), and has
a low long-run mean of 7 bp. The associated market price of risk parameter is imprecisely
estimated and, therefore, is set to zero in the final estimation. With κΛ estimated at 2.35,
Λ(t) tracks much of the variation in Λ˜(t). As expected, when Λ(t) spikes, we observe a
small decrease (increase) in the default (non-default) component of the LIBOR-OIS spread.
However, because of the fast mean-reversion of Λ(t) towards a low long-run mean, the impact
on longer-term IRS-OIS spreads is negligible. The decomposition is reported in Panel C in
Table 9. On average, the default (non-default) component is slightly smaller (larger) at the
short end of the term structure, while indeed there is virtually no effect at longer maturities.
A(2,2,1) without LIBOR rates To address concerns about the integrity of LIBOR during
parts of the sample period, we reestimate the A(2,2,1) specification without using LIBOR
rates. In this case, interbank risk is identified purely from swap rates, which are determined in
highly competitive markets. Panel D in Table 9 reports the decomposition, which is similar to
the original one, except that the non-default component of the LIBOR-OIS spread is slightly
smaller and less volatile.
A(2,2,1) with alternative default risk measures To investigate the sensitivity to possi-
ble liquidity effects in the CDS market, we reestimate the A(2,2,1) specification with the two
liquidity-corrected default risk measures CDSLIQ1 and CDSLIQ2 described in Section 4.3.
Panels E and F in Table 9 report the decomposition of the spread term structure in these two
cases. At the short end of the term structure, the decomposition using CDSLIQ1 (Panel E) on
average attributes a slightly smaller fraction of interbank risk to default risk compared with
the original decomposition, while the decomposition using CDSLIQ2 (Panel F) on average
attributes a slightly larger fraction of interbank risk to default risk. This is consistent with
the fact that, on average, CDSLIQ1 < CDSTrMean < CDSLIQ2. At longer maturities, the
differences are very small.
56Parameter estimates and state variables are available upon request. For the estimation, we assume a market
price of risk process ΓΛ˜
√
Λ˜(t) such that dWΛ˜(t)− ΓΛ˜
√
Λ˜(t) dt becomes a standard Brownian motion under P .
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7 Conclusion
In this paper, we contribute to the rapidly growing literature on the interbank money market
by studying the term structure of interbank risk. We follow most existing studies by measuring
interbank risk by the spread between a LIBOR rate and the rate on an overnight indexed swap
(OIS) of identical maturity. We show that the spread between the fixed rate on a long-term
interest rate swap indexed to, say, 3M LIBOR, and a similar long-term OIS reflects risk-neutral
expectations about future 3M LIBOR-OIS spreads. This allows us to infer a term structure of
interbank risk from swap spreads of different maturities. We develop a dynamic term structure
model with default risk in the interbank market that, in conjunction with information from the
credit default swap market, allows us to decompose the term structure of interbank risk into
default and non-default components. We apply the model to study interbank risk from the
onset of the financial crisis in August 2007 until January 2011. We find that, on average, the
fraction of total interbank risk due to default risk increases with maturity. At the short end
of the term structure, the non-default component is important in the first half of the sample
period and is correlated with various measures of funding liquidity and market liquidity. At
longer maturities, the default component is the dominant driver of interbank risk throughout
the sample period. We also provide tentative results indicating that swap market participants
require compensation for exposure to variation in interbank default risk. Our results hold true
in both the USD and EUR markets and are robust to different model parameterizations and
measures of interbank default risk. Our analysis has implications for monetary and regulatory
policy as well as for pricing, hedging, and risk-management in the interest rate swap market.
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A Proof of (2)
Discounting the integral equation (1) gives
e−
∫ t




















0 r(s)ds (r(u)− rc(u))V (u) du






















































rc(s)dsV (t) is a Q-martingale, and since V (T ) = X we conclude that
e−
∫ t








B Extended doubly stochastic framework
Here, we briefly recap and extend the standard doubly stochastic framework for modeling
default times in our setting.57 The main aspect of our extension is that we can incorporate an
arbitrary number of default times in one framework. We assume that the filtered probability
space (Ω,F ,Ft, Q) carries an i.i.d. sequence of standard exponential random variables ε(t0) ∼
Exp(1), for t0 ≥ 0, which are independent of F∞. For every t0 ≥ 0, we let λ(t0, t) be a
nonnegative Ft-adapted intensity process with the property∫ t
t0
λ(t0, s) ds <∞
57Standard references are Duffie and Singleton (2003) and Lando (2004).
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for all finite t ≥ t0. We then define the random time
τ(t0) = inf
{
t > t0 |
∫ t
t0
λ(t0, s) ds ≥ ε(t0)
}
> t0.
Note that τ(t0) is not an Ft-stopping time but becomes a stopping time with respect to the
enlarged filtration Gt = Ft∨Ht where Ht = ∨t0≥0σ (H(t0, s) | s ≤ t) is the filtration generated
by all τ(t0)-indicator processes H(t0, t) = 1{τ(t0)≤t}. The Gt-stopping times τ(t0) are then
Ft-doubly stochastic in the sense that
EQ
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for all FT -measurable nonnegative random variables Y , see e.g. Filipovic´ (2009, Lemma 12.2).
C Pricing formulas for the affine model
In this section we derive the pricing formulas for the affine model used in this paper. It
is evident from the system of stochastic differential equations composed of (23), (26), and
(29) that the partial state vectors (r(t), γ(t))⊤, (ν(t), µ(t), λ(t0, t))⊤, and (ξ(t), ǫ(t))⊤ form
independent autonomous affine jump-diffusion processes. Hence the subsequent exponential-
affine expressions (40), (42), (46) follow directly from the general affine transform formula in
Duffie, Filipovic´, and Schachermayer (2003, Section 2), and the fact that rc(t) = r(t) + Λ, see
(18). The following formulas are for the full A(2, 2, 2) model. The nested versions, A(2, 2, 1)
and A(2, 1, 1), are obtained by setting the respective model parameters, κǫ, θǫ, σǫ and κµ, θµ, σµ,
equal to zero, and setting ǫ(t) ≡ θξ and µ(t) ≡ θν , respectively.
Lemma C.1. The time t price of the collateralized zero-coupon bond maturing at T equals









= exp [A(T − t) +Br(T − t)r(t) +Bγ(T − t)γ(t)]
(40)
where the functions A and B = (Br, BΛ)









2 + κγθγBγ(τ)− Λ
∂τBr(τ) = −κrBr(τ)− 1
∂τBγ(τ) = −κγBγ(τ) + κrBr(τ)
A(0) = 0, B(0) = 0.
(41)
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Lemma C.2. The time t0-value of an unsecured loan with notional 1 in (16) equals









= Pc(t0, T ) exp [C(T − t0) +Dν(T − t0)ν(t0) +Dµ(T − t0)µ(t0) +Dλ(T − t0)Λ]
(42)
where the functions C and D = (Dν ,Dµ,Dλ)
⊤ solve the system of Riccati equations












2 − κµDµ(τ) + κνDν(τ)
∂τDλ(τ) = −κλDλ(τ)− 1
C(0) = 0, D(0) = 0.
(43)
Proof. We write
























Now the claim follows from the general affine transform formula in Duffie, Filipovic´, and
Schachermayer (2003, Section 2). Note that Dλ(τ) < 0 for all τ > 0. Hence the rational






−ζλξ dξ = ζλ
∫ ∞
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We obtain the following exponential affine expression for the (T −t0)-maturity LIBOR rate
L(t0, T ).
Corollary C.3. The (T − t0)-maturity LIBOR rate given in (17) equals





−1 exp [−C(T − t0)−Dν(T − t0)ν(t0)−Dµ(T − t0)µ(t0)−Dλ(T − t0)Λ]− 1
)
× exp [−E(T − t0)− Fξ(T − t0)ξ(t0)− Fǫ(T − t0)ǫ(t0)]
(44)
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with C(T−t0) and D(T−t0) given in Lemma C.2, and where the functions E and F = (Fξ , Fǫ)
⊤











2 − κǫFǫ(τ) + κξFξ(τ)
E(0) = 0, F (0) = 0.
(45)
Proof. In view of (27) and the affine transform formula in Duffie, Filipovic´, and Schacher-
mayer (2003, Section 2), the multiplicative residual term is given by
1
Ξ(t0, T )
= exp [E(T − t0) + Fξ(T − t0)ξ(t0) + Fǫ(T − t0)ǫ(t0)] (46)
where the functions E and F = (Fξ, Fǫ)
⊤ solve the Riccati equations (45). The corollary now
follows from (17) and Lemma C.2.






rc(s)ds(T − t0)L(t0, T )
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t rc(s)dsPc(t0, T )
])




−C(T−t0)−Dλ(T−t0)ΛEQt [exp [−Dν(T − t0)ν(t0)−Dµ(T − t0)µ(t0)]]− Pc(t, T )
)
× EQt [exp [−E(T − t0)− Fξ(T − t0)ξ(t0)− Fǫ(T − t0)ǫ(t0)]] .
The conditional expectations on the right hand side of the last equality can easily be obtained
in closed form using the affine transform formula in Duffie, Filipovic´, and Schachermayer (2003,
Section 2).
It remains to be checked whether the above conditional expectations are well defined.
Sufficient admissibility conditions on the model parameters are provided by the following
lemma, the proof of which is in the online appendix.
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If conditions (49) and (50) hold for Cν , κν , σν , Cµ, κµ, σµ replaced by Cξ, κξ , σξ, Cǫ, κǫ, σǫ,
respectively, then
EQ [exp [−Fξ(T − t0)ξ(t0)− Fǫ(T − t0)ǫ(t0)]] <∞.
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≥ Cν. In this case, (50) reads as
κµ ≥ σ
2
µCµ, which is automatically satisfied as is shown at the end of the proof of Lemma C.4.
For the CDS coupon rate calculations, we need the respective exponential affine expressions
for (20), (21) and (22). For I1(t0, T ) we obtain
I1(t0, T ) =
N∑
i=1
(ti − ti−1)e−(ti−t0)ΛB(t0, ti). (52)
In both formulas for I2(t0, T ) and Vprot(t0, T ) the following expression shows up










Lemma C.6. We have
J(t0, u) = (g(u− t0) + hν(u− t0)ν(t0) + hµ(u− t0)µ(t0) + hλ(u− t0)Λ) e
−(u−t0)ΛB(t0, u)
where the functions g and h = (hν , hµ, hλ)
⊤ solve the linear inhomogeneous system of ordinary
differential equations








µDµ(τ)hµ(τ)− κµhµ(τ) + κνhν(τ)
∂τhλ(τ) = −κλhλ(τ)
g(0) = 0, h(0) = (0, 0, 1)⊤.
(53)
and where the functions D = (Dν ,Dµ,Dλ)
⊤ are given in Lemma C.2.
Proof. We first decompose J(t0, u) = Pc(t0, u)I(t0, u) with






















58Note that the change of order of differentiation and expectation is justified by dominated convergence. In-









is finite for all v in some neighborhood of zero.
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= exp [G(u− t0, v) +Hν(u− t0, v)ν(t0) +Hµ(u− t0, v)µ(t0) +Hλ(u− t0, v)Λ]
where the functions G and H = (Hν ,Hµ,Hλ)
⊤ solve the system of Riccati equations












2 − κµHµ(τ, v) + κνHν(τ, v)
∂τHλ(τ, v) = −κλHλ(τ, v)− 1
G(0, v) = 0, H(0, v) = (0, 0, v)⊤.
(55)
Hence from (54) we obtain
I(t0, u) = (g(u − t0) + hν(u− t0)ν(t0) + hµ(u− t0)µ(t0) + hλ(u− t0)Λ)
× exp [G(u− t0, 0) +Hν(u− t0, 0)ν(t0) +Hµ(u− t0, 0)µ(t0) +Hλ(u− t0, 0)Λ]
where g(τ) = d
dv
G(τ, v)|v=0 , and h = (hν , hµ, hλ)
⊤ is given by h(τ) = d
dv
H(τ, v)|v=0. Note
that G(τ, 0) = C(τ) − τΛ and H(τ, 0) = D(τ), see Lemma C.2. Differentiating both sides of
the system (55) in v at v = 0 shows that the functions g and h solve the linear inhomogeneous
system of ordinary differential equations (53). Thus the lemma is proved.
D Maximum likelihood estimation
D.1 The state space form
We cast the model in state space form, which consists of a measurement equation and a
transition equation. The measurement equation describes the relation between the state vari-
ables and the OIS rates, interest rate spreads, and CDS spreads, while the transition equation
describes the discrete-time dynamics of the state variables.
Let Xt denote the vector of state variables. While the transition density of Xt is unknown,
its conditional mean and variance is known in closed form, since Xt follows an affine diffusion
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process. We approximate the transition density with a Gaussian density with identical first
and second moments, in which case the transition equation becomes
Xt = Φ0 +ΦXXt−1 + wt, wt ∼ N(0, Qt), (56)
with Φ0, ΦX , and Qt given in closed form.
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The measurement equation is given by
Zt = h(Xt) + ut, ut ∼ N(0,Ω), (57)
where Zt is the vector of OIS rates, interest rate spreads, and CDS spreads observed at time
t, h is the pricing function, and ut is a vector of iid. Gaussian pricing errors with covariance
matrix Ω. To reduce the number of parameters in Ω, we follow usual practice in the empirical
term structure literature in assuming that the pricing errors are cross-sectionally uncorrelated
(that is, Ω is diagonal), and that the same variance, σ2err, applies to all pricing errors.
D.2 The unscented Kalman filter
If the pricing function were linear h(Xt) = h0+HXt, the Kalman filter would provide efficient
estimates of the conditional mean and variance of the state vector. Let Xˆt|t−1 = Et−1[Xt] and
Zˆt|t−1 = Et−1[Zt] denote the expectation of Xt and Zt, respectively, using information up to
and including time t − 1, and let Pt|t−1 and Ft|t−1 denote the corresponding error covariance
matrices. Furthermore, let Xˆt = Et[Xt] denote the expectation of Xt including information
at time t, and let Pt denote the corresponding error covariance matrix. The Kalman filter
consists of two steps: prediction and update. In the prediction step, Xˆt|t−1 and Pt|t−1 are
given by
Xˆt|t−1 = Φ0 +ΦXXˆt−1 (58)
Pt|t−1 = ΦXPt−1Φ′X +Qt, (59)
and Zˆt|t−1 and Ft|t−1 are in turn given by
Zˆt|t−1 = h(Xˆt|t−1) (60)
Ft|t−1 = HPt|t−1H ′ +Ω. (61)
59Approximating the true transition density with a Gaussian makes this a QML procedure. While QML
estimation has been shown to be consistent in many settings, it is in fact not consistent in a Kalman filter
setting, since the conditional covariance matrix Qt in the recursions depends on the Kalman filter estimates of
the volatility state variables rather than the true, but unobservable, values; see, e.g., Duan and Simonato (1999).
However, simulation results in several papers have shown this issue to be negligible in practice.
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In the update step, the estimate of the state vector is refined based on the difference between
predicted and observed quantities, with Xˆt = Et[Xt] and Pt given by
Xˆt = Xˆt|t−1 +Wt(Zt − Zˆt|t−1) (62)
Pt = Pt|t−1 −WtFt|t−1W ′t , (63)
where
Wt = Pt|t−1H ′F−1t|t−1 (64)
is the covariance between pricing and filtering errors.
In our setting, the pricing function is non-linear for all the instruments included in the
estimation, and the Kalman filter has to be modified. Non-linear state space systems have
traditionally been handled with the extended Kalman filter, which effectively linearizes the
measure equation around the predicted state. However, in recent years the unscented Kalman
filter has emerged as a very attractive alternative. Rather than approximating the measure-
ment equation, it uses the true non-linear measurement equation and instead approximates
the distribution of the state vector with a deterministically chosen set of sample points, called
“sigma points”, that completely capture the true mean and covariance of the state vector.
When propagated through the non-linear pricing function, the sigma points capture the mean
and covariance of the data accurately to the 2nd order (3rd order for true Gaussian states) for
any nonlinearity.60
More specifically, a set of 2L+1 sigma points and associated weights are selected according
to the following scheme
Xˆ 0









wi = 12(L+κ) i = 1, ..., L
Xˆ i





wi = 12(L+κ) i = L+ 1, ..., 2L,
(65)
where L is the dimension of Xˆt|t−1, κ is a scaling parameter, wi is the weight associated with





is the i’th column of the matrix square root.
60For comparison, the extended Kalman filter estimates the mean and covariance accurately to the 1st order.
Note that the computational costs of the extended Kalman filter and the unscented Kalman filter are of the
same order of magnitude.
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(Zt − Zˆt|t−1)′F−1t|t−1(Zt − Zˆt|t−1), (69)
where T is the number of observation dates, and Nt is the dimension of Zt.
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Maturity
3M 6M 1Y 2Y 3Y 4Y 5Y 7Y 10Y







































































































































































































Notes: The table shows means and, in parentheses, standard deviations. SPREAD3M denotes the difference
between the fixed rates on an IRS indexed to 3M LIBOR/EURIBOR and an OIS with the same maturity.
SPREAD6M denotes the difference between the fixed rates on an IRS indexed to 6M LIBOR/EURIBOR and
an OIS with the same maturity. CDSTrMean and CDSMedian are the CDS spread term structures for an
average bank within the LIBOR and EURIBOR panels, respectively. CDSLIQ1, and CDSLIQ2 are the CDS
spread term structures corrected for possible liquidity effects as described in the main text. CDSiTraxx is the
iTraxx Senior Financials CDS index. OIS rates are measured in percentages, while interest rate spreads and
CDS spreads are measured in basis points. Each time series consists of 895 daily observations from August 09,
2007 to January 12, 2011, except those marked with † which consist of 643 daily observations from July 28,
2008 to January 12, 2011.
Table 1: Summary statistics of data
Bank Currency Mean CDS Std CDS Balance Liquidity Start date
Bank of America USD 136 62 2230 203 09-Aug-2007
Bank of Tokyo Mitsubishi USD 71 28 1619 17 09-Aug-2007
Barclays EUR 111 46 2227 117 09-Aug-2007
Citigroup USD 201 122 1857 155 09-Aug-2007
Credit Suisse EUR 108 40 997 71 06-May-2008
Deutsche Bank EUR 95 32 2151 159 09-Aug-2007
HSBC EUR 75 29 2364 38 09-Aug-2007
J. P. Morgan Chase USD 92 36 2032 174 09-Aug-2007
Lloyds TSB EUR 122 58 925 58 09-Aug-2007
Rabobank EUR 77 39 871 —— 09-Aug-2007
Royal Bank of Canada USD 75 36 606 —— 09-Aug-2007
Societe Generale EUR 93 34 1467 66 09-Aug-2007
Norinchukin Bank USD 85 41 630 2 09-Aug-2007
RBS EUR 134 53 2739 117 09-Aug-2007
UBS EUR 120 62 1296 81 09-Aug-2007
WestLB EUR 118 41 347 16 09-Aug-2007
Notes: The table displays data on the banks that are members of the LIBOR panel. For each bank, it shows
the currency of the CDS contracts, the mean and standard deviation of the 5Y CDS spread in basis points
per annum, the size of the balance sheet in billion USD equivalent as reported in the 2009 annual report, the
average daily notional of CDS transactions in million USD equivalent as reported by the Depository Trust and
Clearing Corporation, and the date from which the 5Y CDS contract is available in the Markit database.
Table 2: LIBOR panel
Bank Currency Mean CDS Std CDS Balance Liquidity Start date
Erste Bank EUR 186 70 202 8 11-Aug-2008
Raiffeisen Zentralbank EUR 174 93 148 8 09-Aug-2007
Dexia Bank EUR 216 103 578 14 09-Aug-2007
KBC EUR 143 76 324 3 09-Aug-2007
Nordea EUR 74 31 508 —— 09-Aug-2007
BNP-Paribas EUR 71 27 2058 72 09-Aug-2007
Societe Generale EUR 93 34 1024 66 09-Aug-2007
Natixis EUR 161 76 449 5 09-Aug-2007
Credit Agricole EUR 95 37 1557 74 09-Aug-2007
CIC EUR 92 34 236 —— 09-Aug-2007
Landesbank Berlin EUR 108 32 144 —— 14-Aug-2007
Bayerische Landesbank EUR 101 30 339 6 09-Aug-2007
Deutsche Bank EUR 95 32 1501 159 09-Aug-2007
WestLB EUR 118 41 242 16 09-Aug-2007
Commerzbank EUR 88 29 844 91 09-Aug-2007
DZ Bank EUR 106 32 389 —— 09-Aug-2007
Genossenschaftsbank EUR 134 19 68 —— 31-Oct-2008
Norddeutsche Landesbank EUR 99 29 239 —— 09-Aug-2007
Landesbank Baden-Wurttemberg EUR 107 33 412 —— 09-Aug-2007
Landesbank Hessen-Thuringen EUR 111 31 170 —— 09-Aug-2007
National Bank of Greece EUR 342 286 113 —— 09-Aug-2007
Allied Irish Banks EUR 297 265 174 20 09-Aug-2007
Intesa Sanpaolo EUR 83 40 625 117 09-Aug-2007
Monte dei Paschi di Siena EUR 105 57 225 84 09-Aug-2007
Unicredit EUR 121 42 929 114 21-May-2008
ING Bank EUR 91 35 1164 35 09-Aug-2007
RBS EUR 145 20 1912 117 20-Aug-2010
Rabobank EUR 77 39 608 —— 09-Aug-2007
Caixa Geral De Depositos EUR 164 132 121 —— 09-Aug-2007
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria EUR 114 62 535 133 09-Aug-2007
Banco Santander EUR 109 52 1111 156 24-Aug-2007
La Caixa EUR 178 87 272 —— 09-Aug-2007
Notes: Continued on next page.
Table 3: EURIBOR panel
Bank Currency Mean CDS Std CDS Balance Liquidity Start date
Barclays EUR 111 46 1554 117 09-Aug-2007
Danske Bank EUR 87 44 416 9 09-Aug-2007
Svenska Handelsbanken EUR 67 29 207 5 09-Aug-2007
UBS EUR 120 62 904 81 09-Aug-2007
Citigroup USD 201 122 1296 155 09-Aug-2007
J.P. Morgan Chase USD 92 36 1418 174 09-Aug-2007
Bank of Tokyo Mitsubishi USD 71 28 1224 17 09-Aug-2007
Notes: The table displays data on the banks that are members of the EURIBOR panel. For each bank, it shows
the currency of the CDS contracts, the mean and standard deviation of the 5Y CDS spread in basis points
per annum, the size of the balance sheet in billion EUR equivalent as reported in the 2009 annual report, the
average daily notional of CDS transactions in million USD equivalent as reported by the Depository Trust and
Clearing Corporation, and the date from which the 5Y CDS contract is available in the Markit database.
Table 3: EURIBOR panel (cont.)
USD market EUR market





































































































































































































































logL ×10−4 -10.0436 -9.5909 -9.4830 -11.1765 -10.5827 -10.3603
Notes: The sample period is August 09, 2007 to January 12, 2011. Asymptotic standard errors are in paren-
theses. For identification purposes, we fix ζλ at 10 and Λ at 5 bp. We constrain to zero those market price of
risk parameters for which the absolute t-statistic does not exceed one. σerr denotes the standard deviation of
pricing errors.
Table 4: Maximum-likelihood estimates
OIS SPREAD3M SPREAD6M CDS
Panel A: USD market
A(2,1,1) 7.14 7.65 7.63 11.55
A(2,2,1) 7.06 8.12 6.99 6.62



















Panel B: EUR market
A(2,1,1) 6.16 7.66 8.23 11.77
A(2,2,1) 5.93 7.83 7.16 7.07



















Notes: The table reports means of the root mean squared pricing error (RMSE) time-series of OIS rates, interest
rate spreads, and CDS spreads. SPREAD3M denotes the difference between the fixed rates on an IRS indexed
to 3M LIBOR/EURIBOR and an OIS with the same maturity. SPREAD6M denotes the difference between
the fixed rates on an IRS indexed to 6M LIBOR/EURIBOR and an OIS with the same maturity. Units are
basis points. T-statistics, corrected for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation up to 50 lags using the method
of Newey and West (1987), are in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ ∗ ∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels, respectively. Each time series consists of 895 daily observations from August 09, 2007 to January 12,
2011,
Table 5: Comparing model specifications
Maturity
3M 6M 1Y 2Y 3Y 4Y 5Y 7Y 10Y
































































































































Notes: The table shows the decomposition of the spread term structures using the A(2,2,1) specification and
the CDSTrMean and CDSMedian measures of interbank default risk in the USD and EUR markets, respectively.
Each spread is decomposed into a default and a non-default component and the table displays means and, in
parentheses, standard deviations of the two components. SPREAD3M and SPREAD6M denote the spread
term structures indexed to 3M and 6M LIBOR/EURIBOR, respectively. Units are basis points. Each time
series consists of 895 daily observations from August 09, 2007 to January 12, 2011, except those marked with
† which consist of 643 daily observations from July 28, 2008 to January 12, 2011.
Table 6: Decomposition of the term structure of interbank risk
∆Reposprt ∆FGt ∆HPWt ∆RCsprt ∆DFLt ∆DFLfint
Panel A: USD market
∆FGt 0.41
∆HPWt 0.54 0.48
∆RCsprt 0.15 0.53 0.79
∆DFLt 0.41 0.30 0.33 0.21
∆DFLfint 0.41 0.26 0.29 0.14 0.99
∆ξt 0.63 0.44 0.71 0.62 0.43 0.37
Panel B: EUR market
∆FGt 0.42
∆HPWt 0.50 0.45
∆RCsprt 0.10 0.51 0.76
∆DFLt 0.31 0.31 0.26 0.18
∆DFLfint 0.30 0.27 0.21 0.11 0.99
∆ξt 0.63 0.50 0.68 0.63 0.28 0.26
Notes: The table displays pairwise correlations between monthly changes in ξt and the funding and market
liquidity components that are unspanned by default risk. ξt is estimated using the A(2,2,1) specification. The
unspanned liquidity components are the residuals from regressions of liquidity proxies on the first two principal
components of the panel CDS term structure. Reposprt denotes the spread between the 3M Agency MBS
general collateral (GC) repo rate and the 3M Treasury GC repo rate (in basis points). FGt denotes the
Fontaine and Garcia (2011) liquidity factor. HPWt denotes the Hu, Pan, and Wang (2010) liquidity factor.
RCsprt denotes the spread between the 10Y par yields on Refcorp bonds and off-the-run Treasuries. DFLt
and DFLfint denotes the Dick-Nielsen, Feldhutter, and Lando (2012) liquidity factors for the overall corporate
bond market and for bonds issued by financial institutions, respectively.
Table 7: Pairwise correlations
∆Reposprt ∆FGt ∆HPWt ∆RCsprt ∆DFLt ∆DFLfint adj R
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Notes: The table displays results from regressing monthly changes in ξ(t) on monthly changes in the funding and
market liquidity components that are unspanned by default risk. ξt is estimated using the A(2,2,1) specification.
The unspanned liquidity components are the residuals from regressions of liquidity proxies on the first two
principal components of the panel CDS term structure. Reposprt denotes the spread between the 3M Agency
MBS general collateral (GC) repo rate and the 3M Treasury GC repo rate (in basis points). FGt denotes the
Fontaine and Garcia (2011) liquidity factor. HPWt denotes the Hu, Pan, and Wang (2010) liquidity factor.
RCsprt denotes the spread between the 10Y par yields on Refcorp bonds and off-the-run Treasuries. DFLt
and DFLfint denotes the Dick-Nielsen, Feldhutter, and Lando (2012) liquidity factors for the overall corporate
bond market and for bonds issued by financial institutions, respectively. Intercepts are not reported. T -statistics
computed from White (1980) standard errors are in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Table 8: The non-default component and liquidity
Maturity
3M 1Y 2Y 3Y 4Y 5Y 10Y

























































































































































































































Notes: The table shows alternative decompositions, for the USD market, of the spread term structure indexed
to 3M LIBOR, SPREAD3M . Each spread is decomposed into a default and a non-default component and the
table displays means and, in parentheses, standard deviations of the two components. The top panel displays the
original decomposition (i.e. for the A(2,2,1) specification combined with the CDSTrMean measure of interbank
default risk.) Panels A and B display results for the A(2,1,1) and A(2,2,2) specifications, respectively, combined
with the CDSTrMean measure of interbank default risk. Panel C displays results for the A(2,2,1) specification
with a stochastic Λ(t) combined with the CDSTrMean measure of interbank default risk. Panel D displays
results for the A(2,2,1) specification combined with the CDSTrMean measure of interbank default risk, but
without using LIBOR rates in the estimation. Panels E and F display results for the A(2,2,1) specification
combined with the CDSLIQ1 and CDSLIQ2 measures of interbank default risk, respectively. Units are basis
points. Each time series consists of 895 daily observations from August 09, 2007 to January 12, 2011, except
those marked with † which consist of 643 daily observations from July 28, 2008 to January 12, 2011.




















Figure 1: Money market and swap market spreads
The figures shows time-series of the spread between 3M LIBOR and the 3M OIS rate (solid line) and the spread
between the rate on a 5Y interest rate swap indexed to 3M LIBOR and the 5Y OIS rate (dotted line). Note
that the 3M LIBOR-OIS spread reached a maximum 366 basis points on October 10, 2008. The vertical dotted
lines mark the beginning of the financial crisis on August 9, 2007, the sale of Bear Stearns to J.P. Morgan on
March 16, 2008, the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy filing on September 15, 2008, and the downgrade of Greece’s
debt to non-investment grade status by Standard and Poor’s on April 27, 2010. Both time series consists of
1313 daily observations from January 02, 2006 to January 12, 2011.
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Figure 2: State variables, USD
The figure shows the state variables for the three model specifications estimated on USD data The vertical
dotted lines mark the sale of Bear Stearns to J.P. Morgan on March 16, 2008, the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy
filing on September 15, 2008, and the downgrade of Greece’s debt to non-investment grade status by Standard











Panel A2: 3M default prob.
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Figure 3: Default probabilities, USD
The top panels display the risk-neutral 3M expected default probability (EDP) for an average bank within the
current panel as well as for an average bank within the refreshed panel in five year’s time. The bottom panels
display the corresponding 6M EDPs. The vertical dotted lines mark the sale of Bear Stearns to J.P. Morgan on
March 16, 2008, the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy filing on September 15, 2008, and the downgrade of Greece’s
debt to non-investment grade status by Standard and Poor’s on April 27, 2010. Each time series consists of
895 daily observations from August 09, 2007 to January 12, 2011.
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Panel C: 5Y(3M) spread Panel D: 5Y(6M) spread
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Figure 4: Decomposition of USD interbank risk
Decomposing USD interbank risk into default (dark-grey) and non-default (light-grey) components using the
A(2,2,1) specification and the CDSTrMean measure of interbank default risk. Panels A and B display decom-
positions of the 3M and 6M LIBOR-OIS spread, respectively. Panels C and D display decompositions of the
5Y IRS-OIS spread indexed to 3M and 6M LIBOR, respectively. Units are basis points. The vertical dotted
lines mark the sale of Bear Stearns to J.P. Morgan on March 16, 2008, the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy filing
on September 15, 2008, and the downgrade of Greece’s debt to non-investment grade status by Standard and
Poor’s on April 27, 2010. Each time series consists of 895 daily observations from August 09, 2007 to January
12, 2011.
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Figure 5: Decomposition of EUR interbank risk
Decomposing EUR interbank risk into default (dark-grey) and non-default (light-grey) components using the
A(2,2,1) specification and the CDSMedian measure of interbank default risk. Panels A and B display decompo-
sitions of the 3M and 6M EURIBOR-OIS spread, respectively. Panels C and D display decompositions of the
5Y IRS-OIS spread indexed to 3M and 6M EURIBOR, respectively. Units are basis points. The vertical dotted
lines mark the sale of Bear Stearns to J.P. Morgan on March 16, 2008, the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy filing
on September 15, 2008, and the downgrade of Greece’s debt to non-investment grade status by Standard and
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Figure 6: Liquidity proxies
Reposprt denotes the spread between the 3M Agency MBS general collateral (GC) repo rate and the 3M
Treasury GC repo rate (in basis points). FGt denotes the Fontaine and Garcia (2011) liquidity factor. HPWt
denotes the Hu, Pan, and Wang (2010) liquidity factor. RCsprt denotes the spread between the 10Y par
yields on Refcorp bonds and off-the-run Treasuries. DFLt and DFLfint denotes the Dick-Nielsen, Feldhutter,
and Lando (2012) liquidity factors for the overall corporate bond market and for bonds issued by financial
institutions, respectively. The vertical dotted lines mark the sale of Bear Stearns to J.P. Morgan on March
16, 2008, and the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy filing on September 15, 2008. Each time series consists of 27
monthly observations from August, 2007 to December, 2010.
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Figure 7: Pricing of interbank risk in the swap market
The figure displays the model-implied instantaneous Sharpe ratios on a swap spread strategy consisting of
receiving the fixed rate in an IRS indexed to 3M LIBOR and paying the fixed rate in an OIS of the same
maturity. The solid, dashed, and dotted lines correspond to the 1Y, 5Y, and 10Y swap maturities, respectively.
The Sharpe ratios are computed for the A(2,2,1) specification estimated on the USD market. The vertical
dotted lines mark the sale of Bear Stearns to J.P. Morgan on March 16, 2008, the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy
filing on September 15, 2008, and the downgrade of Greece’s debt to non-investment grade status by Standard
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E Proof of Lemma C.4
For the proof of Lemma C.4 we first recall a fundamental comparison result for ordinary
differential equations, which is a special case of a more general theorem proved by Volkmann
(1972):
Lemma E.1. Let R(τ, v) be a continuous real map on R+×R and locally Lipschitz continuous
in v. Let p(τ) and q(τ) be differentiable functions satisfying
∂τp(τ) ≤ R(τ, p(τ))
∂τq(τ) = R(τ, q(τ))
p(0) ≤ q(0).
Then we have p(τ) ≤ q(τ) for all τ ≥ 0.
We only prove the first part of Lemma C.4, the proof of the second part being simi-
lar.61 It follows from Duffie, Filipovic´, and Schachermayer (2003, Theorem 2.16), see also
Filipovic´ (2009, Theorem 10.3), that the affine transform formula
EQ [exp [uνν(τ) + uµµ(τ)]] = exp [φ(τ, u) + ψν(τ, u)ν(0) + ψµ(τ, u)µ(0)]
holds, and the expectation on the left hand side is finite in particular, for u = (uν , uµ)
⊤ ∈ R2
if φ(τ, u), ψν(τ, u) and ψµ(τ, u) are finite solutions of the corresponding system of Riccati
equations
∂τφ(τ, u) = κµθµψµ(τ, u) + Λ





2 − κνψν(τ, u)





2 − κµψµ(τ, u) + κνψν(τ, u)
ψµ(0, u) = uµ.
(E.1)
It is thus enough to show that both, ψν(τ, u
∗) and ψµ(τ, u∗), are finite for all τ ≥ 0 and for
u∗ := (−Dν(T − t0),−Dµ(T − t0))⊤.
61Indeed, after replacing 1
ζλκλ+1
by 1 in (E.2), and in the definition of pν(τ ), Θν and Cν below, the proof of
the second part of Lemma C.4 is literally the same.
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(1− e−κλτ ). This implies − 1
κλ


























Θν (eΘντ + 1) + κν (eΘντ − 1)
where Θν is defined in (47), see e.g. Filipovic´ (2009, Lemma 10.12). We thus obtain the
estimate
0 ≤ −Dν(T − t0) ≤ −pν(T − t0) = Cν . (E.3)
Similarly, in view of (43), (E.3) and Lemma E.1, we infer that pµ(τ) ≤ Dµ(τ) ≤ 0 where





2 − κµpµ(τ)− κνCν
pµ(0) = 0.
(E.4)






Θµ (eΘµτ + 1) + κµ (eΘµτ − 1)
where Θµ is defined in (48). Moreover, it follows by inspection that pµ(τ) ↓ P1 as τ →∞ for








of the differential equation (E.4), and we obtain the estimates
0 ≤ −Dµ(T − t0) ≤ −pµ(T − t0) = Cµ ≤ −P1. (E.5)
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Next, we give a priori bounds on ψν(τ, u
∗) and ψµ(τ, u∗). Denote by P2 = 2κνσ2ν the right




(2κν − σ2νCν) e
κντ + σ2νCν
(E.6)
the solution of (E.1) for ψν(τ, u) with initial condition uν = Cν , see e.g. Filipovic´ (2009,
Lemma 10.12). It then follows from Lemma E.1 and by inspection that
0 ≤ ψν(τ, u
∗) ≤ qν(τ) and qν(τ) ↓ 0 for τ →∞ if Cν < P2, (E.7)
which is (49).
Now suppose that (49) holds, that is, Cν < P2. Combining (E.7) with (E.1), (E.5) and
Lemma E.1 implies
0 ≤ ψµ(τ, u
∗) ≤ qµ(τ)





2 − κµqµ(τ) + κνqν(τ)
qµ(0) = Cµ.
If σµ = 0 then obviously qµ(τ) is finite for all τ ≥ 0, and there is nothing left to prove. So
from now on we assume that σµ > 0 and κµ ≥ 0. Since there is no closed form expression
for qµ(τ) available in general, we are going to control qµ from above by a time-inhomogeneous
linear differential equation. Hereto note the elementary fact that
σ2µ
2
x2 − κµx+ κνqν(τ) ≤ −
κµ
2















for all τ ≥ 0.
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Plugging this in (E.11) and rearrange terms yields (E.9).
In view of (E.7) we infer that the maximum of the left hand side of (E.9) is attained at
τ = τ∗ where
τ∗ = inf
{





and which by (E.6) can be written as in (51). Hence the bound (E.8) holds for all τ ≥ 0 if and










































where 2F1 is the Gauss hypergeometric function. Finally, note that τ
∗ = 0 if and only if
κ2µ
2κνσ2µ





µκνCν − κµ ≤
√
2κ2µ − κµ ≤ κµ,
so that (50) automatically holds. This finishes the proof of Lemma C.4.
62We obtained the integral formula from the computational software program Mathematica.
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F On quotation conventions for basis swaps
As discussed in Section 2.4, there is no universally accepted quotation convention for basis
swaps. The two most common conventions are the following. In the first convention (I), and
the one we use in the paper, the cash flow in a basis swap is the difference between the cash
flows in two IRS indexed to different floating rates. In the case of a 3M/6M basis swap and
with δ = 3M, this implies that one party pays δL(t− δ, t) quarterly, while the other party pays
2δL(t − 2δ, t) semi-annually, with the fixed spread payments made semi-annually in the USD
market and annually in the EUR market. Given that our model has an analytical solution to
an IRS, it also has an analytical solution to a basis swap defined according to this convention.
In the second convention (II), all payments occur at the frequency of the longer floating
rate with the shorter floating rate paid compounded. In the case of a 3M/6M basis swap,
this implies for both markets that on a semi-annual basis one party pays δL(t− 2δ, t− δ)(1 +
δL(t− δ, t)) + δL(t− δ, t) plus a fixed spread, while the other party pays 2δL(t − 2δ, t). If we
assume that payments are made on tenor structure (5) with ti = ti−1+2δ, the basis swap rate
according to this convention is given by














δL(ti−1, ti−1 + δ)(1 + δL(ti−1 + δ, ti)) + δL(ti−1 + δ, ti)
))])
. (F.1)
We now quantify the difference between the two market conventions. For a given param-
eter set and state vector, we compute 3M/6M basis swap rates implied by conventions (I)
analytically, and by convention (II) via simulation.63 We consider both markets and for each
market two state vectors: the mean state vector and the state vector on the day of the widest
1Y basis swap rate. Table F.1 shows the spread term structures implied by convention (I).
It also shows the differences between the spread term structures implied by convention (II)
and (I) along with the standard errors of the simulated basis swap rates in parentheses. On a
typical day, the differences between the spreads implied by the two conventions are very small
both in absolute and relative terms. Even on the day of the widest 1Y basis swap rate, the
differences between the spreads remain very small in relative terms.
63In principle, one can compute basis swap rates for convention (II) analytically as well. However, the
expressions are fairly involved, and as the spreads can be simulated very accurately using a low number of
simulations, we opt for this approach.
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Maturity
1Y 2Y 3Y 4Y 5Y 7Y 10Y
Panel A: USD market, typical day















Panel B: USD market, day of widest 1Y spread















Panel C: EUR market, typical day















Panel D: EUR market, day of widest 1Y spread















Notes: In this table, we asses the difference between the 3M/6M basis swap rates implied by market conventions
(I) and (II). The former can be computed analytically within our model, while the latter is computed by
simulation. For the simulation, we use 2000 paths (1000 plus 1000 antithetic) and the basis swap rate implied
by convention (I) as a very efficient control variate. In each panel, the first line shows the term structure of basis
swap rates implied by convention (I). The second line shows the difference between the term structure of basis
swap rates implied by conventions (II) and (I), with standard errors of the simulated basis swap rates reported
in parentheses. Panels A and C show results using the mean state vector, while Panels B and D show results
using the state vector on the day of the widest 1Y basis swap rate (October 14, 2008 in USD and October 13,
2008 in EUR) We use the A(2,2,1) specification, with parameter estimates reported in Table 4. Basis swap
rates are reported in basis points.
Table F.1: Impact of differences in market convention for basis swaps
G On the (lack of) identification of ζλ
Here, we show that it is very difficult to separately identify ζλ (where
1
ζλ
is the mean jump size in
the default intensity) and the process for ν(t) (the intensity of credit quality deterioration). We
consider the A(2, 2, 1) specification, but the results also hold true for the other specifications.
Let ν(t) = 1
ζλ
ν(t) denote the mean rate of deterioration in the credit quality of an average
panel bank. Its dynamics are given by
dν(t) = κν(µ(t)− ν(t)) dt + σν
√
ν(t) dWν(t)
















We price interest rate spreads and CDS spreads for different values of ζλ keeping the level
of ν(t) and its process unchanged. That is, variation in ζλ is accompanied by adjustments to
ν(t), µ(t), θµ, σµ, and σν . We use the parameters reported in Table 4 for the USD market and
assume that the state vector equals its sample average. We then vary ζλ between 10 and 1000
corresponding to mean jump sizes between 1000 bp and 10 bp.
Figure G.1 shows interest rate and CDS spreads for the 1Y and 10Y maturities as a function
of 1
ζλ
. Overall, the spreads are quite insensitive to the mean jump size, although it appears
that combinations of high mean jump sizes and low intensity of credit quality deterioration
produce slightly lower spreads than combinations of low jump sizes and high intensity of credit
quality deterioration.64 This illustrate that, for valuation of spreads, it is the mean rate of
deterioration in credit quality that matters, and that it would be very difficult to disentangle
ζλ and the process for ν(t).
64A similar conclusion was reached by Collin-Dufresne and Solnik (2001), albeit within a simpler model, in
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Figure G.1: Sensitivity of spreads to 1
ζλ
Sensitivity of interest rate spreads and CDS spreads to variation in the mean jump in the default intensity, 1
ζλ
,
keeping the process for the mean rate of deterioration in credit quality, ν(t), unchanged. SPREAD3M denotes
the difference between the fixed rates on an IRS indexed to 3M LIBOR and an OIS with the same maturity.
SPREAD6M denotes the difference between the fixed rates on an IRS indexed to 6M LIBOR and an OIS with
the same maturity. Solid lines correspond to the 1Y maturity while dash-dotted lines correspond to the 10Y
maturity.
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H Additional tables and figures
Individual RMSEs Tables H.1 and H.2 show individual root mean squared pricing errors
(RMSEs) in the USD and EUR markets, respectively, thus complementing Table 5 in the
paper.
OIS and repo rates Figure H.1 displays 1W OIS and repo rates, while Figure H.2 displays
spreads between 1W OIS and repo rates.
State variables and default probabilities, EUR Figures H.3 and H.4 display the state
variables and the default probabilities, respectively, for the three model specifications estimated
on EUR data. They are the EUR counterparts to Figures 2 and 3 in the paper.
Time series of alternative decompositions Figures H.5 and H.6 show time series of the
alternative decompositions of USD interbank risk at the short end and long end of the term
structure, respectively. They complement Table 9 in the paper.
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Maturity
3M 6M 1Y 2Y 3Y 4Y 5Y 7Y 10Y
Panel A: A(2, 1, 1)
OIS 7.42 5.61 7.83 7.72 7.69 5.42 6.09 11.16
SPREAD3M 12.13 8.96 10.67 8.90 7.23 6.22 5.47
SPREAD6M 10.53 7.98 5.50 6.72 8.09 9.94 12.56
CDS 23.09 9.73 9.25 9.23 8.15 9.95 12.05 15.52
Panel B: A(2, 2, 1)
OIS 7.27 5.29 7.51 7.68 7.66 5.24 6.15 11.09
SPREAD3M 11.40 9.67 9.90 9.81 7.65 5.86 4.75
SPREAD6M 8.68 8.49 5.39 4.91 5.93 8.02 11.76
CDS 13.28 5.52 7.00 5.95 3.90 5.68 5.66 6.28
Panel C: A(2, 2, 2)
OIS 7.36 5.20 7.50 7.64 7.58 5.13 5.96 10.98
SPREAD3M 10.25 9.84 9.10 8.37 7.65 6.07 4.07
SPREAD6M 10.44 7.79 3.72 3.84 5.11 7.00 9.88
CDS 14.27 4.47 6.22 5.29 3.35 5.16 4.34 4.54
Notes: The table reports root mean squared pricing errors (RMSEs) for each point on the term structures of
OIS rates, interest rate spreads, and CDS spreads. SPREAD3M denotes the difference between the fixed rates
on an IRS indexed to 3M LIBOR and an OIS with the same maturity. SPREAD6M denotes the difference
between the fixed rates on an IRS indexed to 6M LIBOR and an OIS with the same maturity. Units are basis
points.
Table H.1: Individual RMSEs, USD market
Maturity
3M 6M 1Y 2Y 3Y 4Y 5Y 7Y 10Y
Panel A: A(2, 1, 1)
OIS 8.02 3.88 10.20 9.74 5.72 4.10 3.98 5.48 9.08
SPREAD3M 11.37 8.26 9.26 9.26 8.93 8.09 7.07 6.10
SPREAD6M 9.81 7.94 7.10 8.04 9.14 9.32 9.91 10.90
CDS 24.35 11.15 9.75 8.39 6.48 9.31 11.17 14.96
Panel B: A(2, 2, 1)
OIS 8.43 3.55 9.76 9.46 5.49 3.76 3.60 5.22 8.75
SPREAD3M 8.49 7.76 9.81 10.11 9.62 8.64 7.23 5.75
SPREAD6M 9.23 7.10 3.93 4.44 5.61 6.09 7.93 10.92
CDS 11.86 5.79 6.97 5.74 3.97 5.76 5.32 5.62
Panel C: A(2, 2, 2)
OIS 8.41 3.52 9.25 9.02 5.44 3.38 2.83 4.95 8.12
SPREAD3M 6.63 8.40 8.78 8.64 8.15 7.47 6.61 5.58
SPREAD6M 9.74 5.94 3.31 3.42 4.64 5.11 6.54 8.91
CDS 11.62 4.79 6.19 4.75 3.05 5.54 3.95 3.99
Notes: The table reports root mean squared pricing errors (RMSEs) for each point on the term structures of
OIS rates, interest rate spreads, and CDS spreads. SPREAD3M denotes the difference between the fixed rates
on an IRS indexed to 3M EURIBOR and an OIS with the same maturity. SPREAD6M denotes the difference
between the fixed rates on an IRS indexed to 6M EURIBOR and an OIS with the same maturity. Units are
basis points.
Table H.2: Individual RMSEs, EUR market
Panel A: 1W OIS and Treasury GC repo rates Panel B: 1W OIS and Agency GC repo rates
Panel C: 1W OIS and Agency MBS GC repo rates Panel D: 1W EUR OIS and GC repo rates
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Figure H.1: OIS and repo rates
The figure shows the 1W USD OIS rate along with the 1W repo rates for Treasury, Agency, and Agency MBS
general collateral (Panels A, B, and C, respectively) as well as the 1W EUR OIS rate along with the 1W Eurepo
rate (Panel D). Grey lines mark OIS rates, while black lines mark repo rates. The vertical dotted lines mark the
sale of Bear Stearns to J.P. Morgan on March 16, 2008, the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy filing on September
15, 2008, and the downgrade of Greece’s debt to non-investment grade status by Standard and Poor’s on April
27, 2010. Each time series consists of 895 daily observations from August 09, 2007 to January 12, 2011.
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Figure H.2: Spreads between OIS and repo rates
The figure shows the spread between the 1W USD OIS rate and the 1W repo rates for Treasury, Agency, and
Agency MBS general collateral (Panels A, B, and C, respectively) as well as the spread between the 1W EUR
OIS rate and the 1W Eurepo rate (Panel D). The vertical dotted lines mark the sale of Bear Stearns to J.P.
Morgan on March 16, 2008, the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy filing on September 15, 2008, and the downgrade
of Greece’s debt to non-investment grade status by Standard and Poor’s on April 27, 2010. Each time series
consists of 895 daily observations from August 09, 2007 to January 12, 2011.
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A(2,1,1)
Panel A: r(t) and γ(t)
A(2,2,1)
Panel B: r(t) and γ(t)
A(2,2,2)
Panel C: r(t) and γ(t)
r(t)
γ(t)
Panel D: ν(t) Panel E: ν(t) and µ(t) Panel F: ν(t) and µ(t)
ν(t)
µ(t)
Panel G: ξ(t) Panel H: ξ(t) Panel I: ξ(t) and ǫ(t)
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Figure H.3: State variables, EUR
The figure shows the state variables for the three model specifications estimated on EUR data The vertical
dotted lines mark the sale of Bear Stearns to J.P. Morgan on March 16, 2008, the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy
filing on September 15, 2008, and the downgrade of Greece’s debt to non-investment grade status by Standard











Panel A2: 3M default prob.
A(2,2,2)
Panel A3: 3M default prob.
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Panel B2: 6M default prob. Panel B3: 6M default prob.
spot
5Y fwd
Jan08 Jan09 Jan10 Jan11Jan08 Jan09 Jan10 Jan11Jan08 Jan09 Jan10 Jan11


































Figure H.4: Default probabilities, EUR
The top panels display the risk-neutral 3M expected default probability (EDP) for an average bank within the
current panel as well as for an average bank within the refreshed panel in five year’s time. The bottom panels
display the corresponding 6M EDPs. The vertical dotted lines mark the sale of Bear Stearns to J.P. Morgan on
March 16, 2008, the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy filing on September 15, 2008, and the downgrade of Greece’s
debt to non-investment grade status by Standard and Poor’s on April 27, 2010. Each time series consists of
895 daily observations from August 09, 2007 to January 12, 2011.
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Panel A: A(2, 1, 1), CDSTrMean Panel B: A(2, 2, 2), CDSTrMean
Panel C: A(2, 2, 1), stochastic Λ(t), CDSTrMean Panel D: A(2, 2, 1), no LIBOR, CDSTrMean
Panel E: A(2, 2, 1), CDSLIQ1 Panel F: A(2, 2, 1), CDSLIQ2
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Figure H.5: Alternative decompositions of USD interbank risk, 3M horizon
Alternative decompositions of the 3M LIBOR-OIS spread into default (dark-grey) and non-default (light-grey)
components. Panels A and B display results using the A(2,1,1) and A(2,2,2) specifications, respectively, com-
bined with the CDSTrMean measure of interbank default risk. Panel C displays results for the A(2,2,1) spec-
ification with a stochastic Λ(t), combined with the CDSTrMean measure of interbank default risk. Panel D
displays results for the A(2,2,1) specification, combined with the CDSTrMean measure of interbank default risk,
but without using LIBOR rates in the estimation. Panels E and F display results using the A(2,2,1) specification
combined with the CDSLIQ1 and CDSLIQ2 measures of interbank default risk, respectively. Units are basis
points. The vertical dotted lines mark the sale of Bear Stearns to J.P. Morgan on March 16, 2008, the Lehman
Brothers bankruptcy filing on September 15, 2008, and the downgrade of Greece’s debt to non-investment
grade status by Standard and Poor’s on April 27, 2010. Each time series consists of 895 daily observations from
August 09, 2007 to January 12, 2011.
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Panel A: A(2, 1, 1), CDSTrMean Panel B: A(2, 2, 2), CDSTrMean
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Figure H.6: Alternative decompositions of USD interbank risk, 5Y horizon
Alternative decompositions of the 5Y IRS-OIS spread indexed to 3M LIBOR into default (dark-grey) and non-
default (light-grey) components. Panels A and B display results using the A(2,1,1) and A(2,2,2) specifications,
respectively, combined with the CDSTrMean measure of interbank default risk. Panel C displays results for the
A(2,2,1) specification with a stochastic Λ(t), combined with the CDSTrMean measure of interbank default risk.
Panel D displays results for the A(2,2,1) specification, combined with the CDSTrMean measure of interbank
default risk, but without using LIBOR rates in the estimation. Panels E and F display results using the A(2,2,1)
specification combined with the CDSLIQ1 and CDSLIQ2 measures of interbank default risk, respectively. Units
are basis points. The vertical dotted lines mark the sale of Bear Stearns to J.P. Morgan on March 16, 2008,
the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy filing on September 15, 2008, and the downgrade of Greece’s debt to non-
investment grade status by Standard and Poor’s on April 27, 2010. Each time series consists of 895 daily
observations from August 09, 2007 to January 12, 2011.
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